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I. THE PARADOX OF JUDrIIAL REVIEW OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT
ARBITRATION AWARDS
A. Introduction
Private forms of workplace arbitration are more prevalent than ever. In
unionized work settings, labor arbitration provides employers and unions an
indispensable method for adjusting their relationship. Until recently, most
nonunion firms provided no arbitration for employment disputes.' In the past few
years, however, many employers have adopted employment arbitration.
2
This development has generated much more controversy than the labor-
management mbdel.3 Critics charge that the newer model, which forces
employees to forgo access to courts in return for access to arbitration, is strongly
biased in favor of employers. 4 On the other hand, employees face serious
obstacles when they seek to adjudicate legal claims arising out of their
An estimate of.the use of arbitration by nonunion employers as of 1990 appears in
David Lewin, Grievance Procedures in Nonunion Workplaces: An Empirical Analysis of
Usage, Dynamics, and Outcomes, 66 CHi.-KENTL. REV. 823,824-25 (1990). See also GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION-MOST PRIVATE-SECTOR EMPLOYERS
USE ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION (1995), WL GAO/HEHS 95-150 (GAO survey of
2000 businesses found that almost all firms with 100 or more employees used an ADR
method).
2 See Altern ative Dispute Resolution: Most Large Employers PreferADR as Alternative
to Litigation, Survey Says, 93 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-4 (May 14, 1997) (surveying 530
Fortune 1000 companies and finding that seventy-nine percent of employers use arbitration).
See also Mei L. Bickner et al., Developments in Employment Arbitration, DISP. RESOL. J.,
Jan. 1997, at 8, 78 (reporting a massive increase in the use of arbitration in nonunion
workplaces following the Supreme Court's Gilmer decision in 1991).
3 See Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197,202 (2d Cir. 1998) ("In the aftermath
of Gilmer ... mandatory binding arbitration of employment discrimination disputes as a
condition of employment has caused increased controversy."). Arbitration of individual
employment rights has led to concerns that it (1) is usually imposed upon employees, (2)
precludes individuals from suing in court to protect their employment rights, (3) imposes
unfair forum fees, (4) denies recovery for attorney fees, (5) offers arbitrators who are
typically older white males with a possible predisposition to rule in favor of employers,
especially in race and sex discrimination cases, (6) fails to screen arbitrators adequately to
determine their qualifications, and (7) is biased by the repeat player effect.
4 E.g., Robert A. Gorman, The Gilmer Decision and the Private Arbitration of
Public-Law Disputes, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 635 (1995); Katherine Van Wezel Stone,
Mandatory Arbitration ofIndividual Employment Rights: The Yellow Dog Contracts ofthe
1990s, 73 DENY. U. L. REV. 1017 (1996).
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employment. They may have difficulty obtaining counsel.5 If they succeed in
persuading an attorney to represent them in federal court, they face crowded
dockets with concomitant delays, and long odds of ever receiving a verdict on the
merits of their claims.6 In response, Congress has amended key employment
discrimination laws and fostered private dispute resolution systems to encourage
use of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) methods, including arbitration.
7
Our Article examines a paradox inherent in workplace arbitration systems.8
This method is supposed to provide disputants a low-cost alternative to courts,
permit them to select the arbiter, and adjudicate their cases quickly and
efficiently.9 To preserve these advantages, arbitrator awards should be final and
5 William M. Howard, Arbitrating Claims of Employment Discrimination, 50 Disp.
REsOL. J., Oct.-Dec. 1995, at 40, 44. One survey of attorneys who represent plaintiffs in
employment discrimination disputes found that respondents accepted five percent of the
cases in which their legal services were requested.
6 Statistical measures of this complex problem are reported by Susan K. Gauvey, ADR 's
Integration in the Federal Court System, 34 MD. B. J. 36,41 (2001) (reporting that the rate
of civil cases that go to trial in federal courts has steadily declined (8.4% in 1975, 4.7% in
1985, 3.5% in 1995, and 2.3% as of June 30, 2000)). See also Marika Litras, Bureau of
Justice Statistics Report on Civil Rights, Complaints Filed in U.S. District Courts, 13 Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) E-5, at E-1 0, E-1 5 (Jan. 20,2000). A study of employment discrimination
lawsuits in the federal courts found that the proportion disposed of by trial declined from
nine percent in 1990 to five percent in 1998. This study also found that the median amount
of time for processing an employment discrimination case from filing to trial verdict was
eighteen months in 1998.
7 See The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, 12212 (1994).
See also The Civil Rights Act of 1991 (amending Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act), 42
U.S.C. § 1981. Both acts encourage the use of arbitration to resolve disputes. Recent
examples of ADR initiatives are The Civil Justice Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. § 471 (1994)
(authorizing more ADR programs to be administered by federal courts to alleviate problems
with cost and delay); the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998,28 U.S.C. §§ 651-658
(1999); and the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act, enacted in 1990, 5 U.S.C. § 571 (a)
(1999) (all federal agencies to implement ADR policies for internal disputes).
8 E.g., Sarah Rudolph Cole, Managerial Litigants? The Overlooked Problem of Party
Autonomy in Dispute Resolution, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 1199 (2000). See generally Owen M.
Fiss, Comment, Against Settlement, 93 YALE. L.J. 1073 (1984) (an earlier publication that
remains influential on this subject).
9 Letter from the Office of Arbitration Services, Federal Mediation and Conciliation
Service, to Arbitration Services Customers (Feb. 2001) (on file with authors) (reporting on
measures of cost and efficiency from October 1, 1999 to September 30,2000). On average,
FMCS arbitrators charged a daily rate of $672, fees of $2,863.49, and expenses of $321.67.
Id. at 2. The average total charge to a union and employer was $3,185.16, id., which the
parties typically split on an equal basis. FMCS requires arbitrators to contact the parties
within fourteen days to set a hearing date. Regulations also require that arbitrators make
awards no later than sixty days from the date of the closing of the record as determined by
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binding. Ifa sore loser at arbitration succeeds in having a court vacate an award,
this breaches the promise made by the disputants to abide by the arbitrator's
ruling. This logic implies that courts should play no role in reviewing arbitration
awards.
Imagine, however, that courts never reviewed an arbitrator's ruling or that
they carried out such perfunctory reviews that every appealed award was
confirmed. The Supreme Court considered this in 1960 when they decided the
Steelworkers Trilogy (the Trilogy). Following its theory in Lincoln Mills that
Congress created federal jurisdiction to fashion a common law to enforce labor
agreements,10 the Court set forth standards for judicial review of the labor
arbitration process in the Trilogy." If arbitration lacks this external constraint,
what prevents an arbitrator from exceeding her authority, or imposing her own
brand of industrial justice? What if her award fails to draw its essence from the
agreement? If courts cannot vacate problematical awards, arbitrator
misjudgments cannot be corrected. This, too, breaches the parties' agreement.
Even if these contractual problems do not arise, an award can violate an
important law or rule. Arbitration is above the law if courts cannot vacate awards
that conflict with public policy.
These paradoxical concerns carry over to the arena of individual employment
rights with additional dilemmas for reviewing courts. Arbitration of individual
employment rights is in a much earlier stage of development than labor
arbitration. Thus, the standards for reviewing these arbitration awards have yet to
be promulgated in Supreme Court decisions like the Trilogy. Without such
guidance, federal courts have applied statutory standards under the Federal
the arbitrator. For a comparison to individual employment arbitration, see Cole v. Bums Int'l
Sec. Sen's., 105 F.3d 1465, 1481 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (estimating arbitrators' fees of $250-
$350 per hour and fifteen to forty hours of arbitrator time in an employment case, for total
arbitrators' fees of $3,750 to $14,000). See also Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Sys.,
Inc., 238 F.3d 549, 552 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d
933, 936 (4th Cir. 1999) ("[T]he arbitration of disputes enables parties to avoid the costs
associated with pursuing ajudicial resolution of their grievances. By one estimate, litigating
a typical employment dispute costs at least $50,000 and takes two and one-half years to
resolve.").
10 Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). See infra notes 76-82
and accompanying text.
I United Steelworkers v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers v.
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel
& Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
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Arbitration Act (FAA). 12 They have also developed non-statutory standards to
review awards, such as manifest disregard of the law.13
The dilemmas posed by these appealed employment arbitration awards are
more complicated because they often result from a very different bargain. In the
labor-management realm, unions seek grievance arbitration and employers are
free to take it or leave it, or negotiate over it.14 In the nonunion setting,
employers often impose arbitration upon their employees to avoid expensive
liability for discrimination.15 Thus, agreements to arbitrate individual
employment rights are sometimes adhesive. 16 They may also institutionalize bias
or other serious problems in the selection of arbitrators. 17 Unlike the federal
judiciary, where presidential appointments are made consciously to reflect
diversity in American society, the pool of arbitrators available to hear
employment discrimination cases is much more homogeneous. 18 Thus, if courts
12 Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000). See infra note 307.
13 The most common non-statutory standard is manifest disregard of the law. For a
more complete discussion, see Brad A. Galbraith, Note, Vacatur of CommercialArbitration
Awards in Federal Court: Contemplating the Use and Utility ofthe 'Manifest Disregard' of
the Law Standard, 27 IND. L. REv. 241 (1993).
14 E.g., Lehigh Portland Cement Co. v. Cement, Lime, Gypsum, and Allied Workers
Div., 849 F.2d 820, 826 (3rd Cir. 1988).
15 See GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note I (stating that private firms use ADR
systems because "almost any system is quicker, cheaper, and less harrowing than going to
court").
16 For example, the Supreme Court of California, holding that a mandatory
employment arbitration agreement was adhesive and unconscionable, stated,
It was imposed on employees as a condition of employment and there was no
opportunity to negotiate.... [T]he economic pressure exerted by employers on all but
the most sought-after employees may be particularly acute, for the arbitration agreement
stands between the employee and necessary employment, and few employees are in a
position to refuse ajob because of an arbitration requirement.).
Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 690 (Cal. 2000).
17 E.g., GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PROCEDURES FOR UPDATING ARBITRATOR
DISCLOSURE INFORMATION (2000), WL GAO/HEHS 01-162.
18 Carl Tobias, Judicial Selection at the Clinton Administration's End, 19 LAW & INEQ.
159, 167 (2001). Empirical research by Tobias showed that "[i]n 1994, President Clinton
named twenty-nine women (29%) and thirty-seven (37%) minorities out of 101 judges." The
push to increase diversity on the federal bench is so powerful that President George W. Bush
gave this significant consideration in announcing his first group of federal judges. Among
these eleven appointees, he nominated two African-Americans, one Hispanic, and one
woman. See also John Harwood & Robert Greenberger, Bush's Judicial Picks Signal the
Beginning of Battle for Courts, WALL ST. J., May 10, 2001, at Al. Cf EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION-HOW REGISTERED REPRESENTATIVES FARE IN DISCRIMINATION DISPUTES
(1994), WL GAO/HEHS 94-17 [hereinafter REGISTERED REPRESENTATIVES] (showing that in
[Vol. 17:1 20011
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rubber-stamp every award challenged under this system, the worst tendencies of
this dispute resolution process never can be curbed.
B. Organization of This Article
This Article may be the first to provide empirical measures ofjudicial review
of workplace arbitration awards in the labor-management and individual rights
domains. Thus, it provides new evidence about the autonomy of these vital
dispute resolution processes. This study also shows how courts hold workplace
arbitration accountable to public laws.
Section fI examines the Supreme Court's promotion of workplace arbitration
in the separate arenas of union-management relations and individual employment
rights. 19 When the Eightieth Congress enacted sweeping reforms to curb union
powers in 1947, they sought a legal process to secure labor's compliance with
contractual promises not to strike employeis'. Their solution was section, 301 of
the Taft-Hartley Act, a provision that vested federal courts with jurisdiction to
enforce labor agreements. 20 Section II.A. analyzes this statutory source for
enforcing labor arbitration awards. 21
Congress failed to make clear, however, whether federal courts were to apply
state contract law to disputes arising under labor agreements, or develop their
own common law consistent with federal labor law. Section II.B. examines how
the Supreme Court adopted the latter view in its seminal Lincoln Mills
decision.22 This section also explores the Trilogy decisions decided by the Court
three years later. There, the Court set forth standards that made arbitration
awards final and binding except in unusual circumstances.
23
Our research in section II.C. examines a more recent development in the
emergence ofjudicial review standards. The Court's decisions in W.R. Grace &
Co. v. Rubber Workers and United Paperworkers International Union i.
Misco,2 4 grew out of awards that conflicted in some sense with a public policy.
We explain how the Court set forth very narrow grounds, consistent with
1992, the typical NYSE arbitrator was a white male, sixty years of age; only eleven percent
were women, and less than one percent were African American).
19 See infra notes 58-143.
20 See infra notes 68-69.
21 See infra notes 58-71.
22 See infra notes 72-83.
23 See infra notes 83-94.
24 See infra notes 97 and 100, respectively.
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principles from the Trilogy, for vacating arbitrator rulings on public policy
grounds.2
5
Section II.D. describes how the Supreme Court renewed its protective
jurisdiction over this dispute resolution process during the 2000-2001 term.26
Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers provides additional
guidance for courts in which award-appeals are based on a specific government
regulation.27 Major League Baseball Players Ass'n v. Garvey is the first
Supreme Court decision that exclusively deals with vacatur of awards when a
judge disagrees with an arbitrator's findings of fact.
28
Part II.E. examines the much newer area of judicial review of individual
employment arbitration. 29 Unlike labor arbitration, this story begins in 1925
when Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) in response to judicial
hostility to commercial arbitration. The FAA granted federal courts jurisdiction
to enforce arbitration clauses in contracts, and stated very limited grounds for
vacating awards. The law excluded contracts of seamen and rail workers, but the
significance of this provision for employment arbitration did not surface until
recently. In the landmark decision, Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,
30
the Supreme Court ruled that a securities broker's agreement with his
employer-which mandated arbitration of all disputes between the parties-
precluded him from suing under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act on
an age discrimination claim. In response to a conflict among circuit courts, the
Supreme Court very recently extended Gilmer to cover almost all individual
employment contracts.
31
Section II explores the research literature on judicial review of arbitration
and explains our attempt to improve on the methodology that typifies these
studies. 32 Section III. also raises questions about the methods and conclusions of
research.33 In addition, Section . sets forth the research methodology for this
quantitative study.34 Adapting the methodology from our 1991 analysis of 1118
district court and 480 appellate court decisions, which ruled on challenged
25 See infra notes 95-112.
26 See infra notes 113-21.
27 See infra note 114.
28 See infra notes 118-21.
29 See infra notes 122-43.
30 See infra notes 120-29.
31 See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 121 S. Ct. 1302 (2001).
32 See infra notes 144-56.
33 See infra notes 144-49.
34 See infra notes 150-56.
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arbitration awards,35 we explain how we used online research methods to survey
federal decisions from late June 1991 to late March 2001.36 We also discuss how
we applied this methodology to Gilmer-type arbitration appeals.
The results from this empirical investigation are presented in Section IV.
37
The first section provides two tables of data that summarize our findings for
labor arbitration appeals. Table 1 compares court confirmation rates of awards in
1960-1991 and 1991-2001. 38 Table 2 shows how courts rule when presented
with a variety of Trilogy orMisco issues.39 Section IV.B. features Table 3, where
we present results for arbitration of individual employment rights.
40
Section V probes beyond our statistical findings byidentifying decisions that
epitomize current trends.41 We begin in section V.A. by deducing a range of
acceptable award confirmation rates.42 This is an important advance in the
research literature, because commentators have not stated or hinted at an
appropriate performance standard for federal courts that review awards.43 We
extend our inquiry to other empirical studies of judicial behavior in reversing
adjudicatory bodies that have original jurisdiction of disputes. Although they are
rare, these studies have examined trends in federal court review of orders by the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board)44 and verdicts by patent
35 See infra note 154; pp. 54-56 tbl.3.
36 See infra notes 154-55.
37 See infra notes 157-64 and accompanying text, and Tables 1-3.
38 See infra p. 50 tbl.1.
39 See infra p. 52 tbl.2. We find that (1) courts are consistent in confirming challenged
awards, (2) courts in the South confirm a much lower percentage of awards, (3) most
challenged awards favor unions, and (4) confirmation rates vary only moderatelybythe type
of issue used to challenge awards.
4 0 See infra pp. 54-56 tbl.3. The main findings show that challenges to individual
employment arbitration awards are a recent development, mostly occurring since 1999; most
involve the securities industry;, over half the cases raise discrimination claims, and almost
half have either female or African-American complainants; most arbitrations involve
terminations; employees receive monetary compensation in about one-third of all awards,
and are more likely than employers to sue to vacate an award; employers win about two-
thirds of these award-challenge cases; and courts confirm a very high percentage of
individual employment awards but fewer awards in the most recent period.
41 See infra notes 165-375.
42 See infra notes 165-92.
43 See infra notes 147-148.
44 See infra notes 173-179.
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courts. 4 5 We also discuss a similar study of state appellate court reversals of
death penalty sentences.
46
Section V.B. is organized around a matrix in Chart 1.47 This posits three
sources that cause abnormally low or high confirmation rates in the labor and
employment rights arenas (yielding six cells in our matrix). 48 This, too, is an
advance over previous research, because commentators consider judges the only
culprits in driving down award confirmations. Our discussion for Cell 1
highlights cases in which judges appeared to ignore the Trilogy by re-arbitrating
the underlying disputes. 49 Cell 2 presents cases of foolish judgment or behavior
by labor arbitrators. 50 Cell 3 examines several cases in which arbitrators
reinstated terminated drug or alcohol offenders, and courts vacated their
awards. 51 These cases show a conflict between arbitral and judicial values.
Cells 4 through 6 involve arbitrations of individual employment rights. In
Cell 4, we examine a case in which a judge appeared to be at fault for ignoring
clear signs of an unfair arbitration. 52 Cell 5 explores cases where arbitrators may
have been at fault. In these decisions, courts vacated awards that were in
manifest disregard of the law. 53 Cell 6 focuses on cases where the arbitrator's
error may have been a by-product of a serious flaw in the dispute resolution
process. 5
4
Our conclusions appear in Section VI. 55 Tying together our empirical
findings in Section IV and our theoretical model of an appropriate range of
award confirmation rates in Section V, we conclude that in the labor-
management arena most courts, except those in the South, have performed
appropriately.56 In the domain of individual employment arbitrations, courts have
also behaved appropriately, although here we observe that judicial performance
is hampered by the lack of clear reviewing standards similar to those
45 See infra notes 181-84.
46 See infra notes 185-89.
47 See infra notes 104-375.
48 These include (1) judges, (2) arbitrators, and (3) the arbitration system.
49 See infra notes 194-206.
50 See infra notes 207-58.
51 See infra notes 259-92.
52 See infra notes 293-311.
53 See infra notes 312-54.
54 See infra notes 355-75.
55 See infra notes 376-415.
56 See infra notes 378-98.
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promulgated by the Supreme Court in the Trilogy, W.R. Grace, and Misco in the
union-management context.
57
]I. THE SUPREME COURT PROMOTES WORKPLACE ARBITRATION
A. The Origins of Judicial Review Standards for Labor Arbitration
Awards
In this Section, we trace the development of judicial standards for court
review of labor arbitration. 58 We also highlight the unusually large number of
workplace arbitration decisions handed down by the U.S. Supreme Court during
its 2000-2001 term.59 By devoting a disproportionate share of its annual
caseload to workplace arbitration in this term, the justices revealed their abiding
interest in this subject.
60
The widespread diffusion of labor arbitration in the years leading up to the
Trilogy accounts for the Supreme Court's view that judges should respect the
autonomy of this dispute resolution system. Following a wave of national strikes
in 1946;a Republican Congress enacted the Labor-Management Relations Act of
1947 (also called the LMRA or the Taft-Hartley Act).61 This legislation
consisted of a series of amendments to the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)
to curb union power.
Section 301 of the LMRA was a major part of this collective bargaining
reform. On its face, it provided an innocuous grant of jurisdiction to federal
courts for the purpose of enforcing collective bargaining agreements. To unions,
however, federal jurisdiction of labor disputes revived a long and bitter history.
Federal courts were widely acknowledged to be biased against unions in labor
57 See infra notes 399-412.
58 For a highly regarded analysis of the early phases of this evolution, see Theodore J.
St. Antoine, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: A Second Look at Enterprise
Wheel andIts Progeny, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1137 (1977).
59 Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers, 531 U.S. 57 (2000); Circuit
City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001); Major League Baseball Players Ass'n v.
Garvey, 121 S. Ct. 1724 (2001).
60To put the three workplace arbitration cases during the 2000-2001 term in
perspective, see Robert S. Greenberger & Jackie Calmes, Next President Likely to Tip
Balance of Supreme Court, WALL ST. J., Oct. 2, 2000, at A36 (reporting that the Court
decided only seventy-three cases in its 1999-2000 term).
61 See I ABA SECTION OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW, THE DEVELOPING LABOR
LAW 36 (Patrick Hardin ed., 3d ed. 1992).
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disputes during the early twentieth century.62 As a consequence, Congress
divested federal courts of jurisdiction to enjoin these disputes when the Norris-
LaGuardia Act was passed in 1932.63
As Republicans took control of the Eightieth Congress, they sought to make
unions "responsible partners in collective bargaining."64 The NLRA provided no
mechanism to enforce labor agreements in federal courts. As a result, when
unions who had agreed to a no-strike clause in a contract violated this promise,
employers were unable to get a court order of enforcement. 65 In sum,
Republicans aimed to secure union compliance with contractual promises.
66
This explains why unions perceived sections 301(a) and (b) as a double
threat. Because unions were voluntary associations and not corporations, they
could not be sued in state courts.67 Section 301(a) remedied this jurisdictional
void by providing that
[s]uits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this
Act, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district
court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to
the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
6 8
62 This is well-documented in the seminal treatise, FELIX FRANKFURTER & NATHAN
GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930).
63 Norris LaGuardia Act, ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 101-115 (1999)). The bill's author, Rep. Fiorello LaGuardia, explained, "Gentlemen,
there is one reason why this legislation is before Congress, and that one reason is
disobedience of the law on the part of whom? On the part of organized labor? No.
Disobedience of the law on the part of a few Federal judges." 75 Cong. Rec. H5478 (March
8, 1932) (statement of Rep. LaGuardia).
64 James E. Pfander, Judicial Purpose and the Scholarly Process: The Lincoln Mills
Case, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 243, 256 (1991).
65 S. REP. NO. 80-105 (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947 at 421 (1959).
66 See H. R. REP. No. 80-245 (1947), reprinted in I NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947 at 337 (1959), stating,
When labor organizations make contracts with employers, such organizations should be
subject to the same judicial remedies and processes in respect of proceedings involving
violations of such contracts as those applicable to all other citizens. Labor organizations
cannot justifiably ask to be treated as responsible contracting parties unless they are
willing to assume the responsibilities of such contracts to the same extent as the other
party must assume his.
67 Id.




Section 301(b) provided that unions could be sued for damages.69
As the Supreme Court later noted in the Trilogy, the institution of labor
arbitration was fundamental to imposing this regulatory scheme:
[T]he grievance machinery under a collective bargaining agreement is at the
very heart of the system of industrial self-government. Arbitration is the means
of solving the unforeseeable by molding a system of private law for all the
problems which may arise and to provide for their solution in a way which will
generally accord with the variant needs and desires of the parties. The
processing of disputes through the grievance machinery is actually a vehicle by
which meaning and content are given to the collective bargaining
agreement... The grievance procedure is, in other words, a part of the
continuous collective bargaining process.
70
In sum, section 301 made arbitration in collective bargaining agreements
"the terminal point of a disagreement."'7 1
B. Early Development of Federal Common Law To Enforce Labor
Agreements: Lincoln Mills and the Trilogy
During the period when the LMRA became law, most employers and unions
agreed to arbitrate disputes that arose under their contracts. 72 As one
commentator from the period observed, "[t]he substitution of arbitration for
69 The Act of June 23, 1947, ch. 120, tit. ]I, § 301, 61 Stat. 156-157 (codified at 29
U.S.C. § 185(b)), stated,
Any labor organization which represents employees in an industry affecting
commerce... shall be bound by the acts of its agents. Any such labor organization may
sue or be sued as an entity and in behalf of the employees whom it represents in the
courts of the United States. Any money judgment against a labor organization in a
district court of the United States shall be enforceable only against the organization as
an entity and against its assets, and shall not be enforceable against any individual
member or his assets.
70 United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581 (1960).
7 11d. at 581.
7 2 See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, ARBITRATION PROVISIONS
IN UNION AGREEMENTS 2, 4 tbl.l col.2 (1944) (seventy-three percent of 1254 firms covered
by a labor agreement had an arbitration provision in their contract); BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, LABOR-MANAGEMENT CONTRACT PROVISIONS 1 (1951)
(eighty-three percent of 1482 firms covered by a labor agreement had an arbitration
provision in their contract); BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, LABOR-
MANAGEMENT CONTRACT PROVISIONS 10 (1953) (eighty-nine percent of 1442 firms covered
by a labor agreement had an arbitration provision in their contract).
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economic weapons in disputes under contract... is a salutary development. 73
Numerous problems arose. 74 Management resistance to the authority of
arbitrators75 aggravated these difficulties.
Matters came to a head in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills.76 This
simple dispute involved a union grievance over work loads, which the employer
refused to submit to arbitration. 77 In an ironic twist-employers, after all, were
expected to utilize federal courts to protect their rights in labor agreements-a
union sued under section 301 to enforce its arbitration clause. 78 The case raised
the basic issue of whether Congress intended federal courts to be simply a neutral
venue for applying state contract law to labor agreements, or whether federal
courts were supposed to develop their own common law for these contracts.79 In
73 LUDWIG TELLER, MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS UNDER COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 350
(1947).
74 A comprehensive overview appears in Harold W. Davey, Hazards in Labor
Arbitration, I INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 386 (1948) (problems included confusion between
arbitration and mediation, scope of the arbitration clause, definition of grievance procedures,
misuses such as excessive resort to arbitration and use of arbitration as a face-saving device).
75 See the veiled contempt for arbitrators expressed by a notable management attorney
in Tracy H. Ferguson, An Appraisal ofArbitration: A Management Viewpoint, 8 INDUS. &
LAB. REL. REV. 79 (1954):
There is no doubt that political events since 1935 have played a part in shaping the
thinking of those who have served as arbitrators. Admittedly, the Wagner Act was an
invasion of 'management's prerogatives' as was other legislation that followed.
Decisions of administrative agencies thereunder have 'whittled away' management's
prerogatives. With such a tendency apparent in law books and the actions of
government agencies, it is understandable that those who are experts in the field,
trained primarily through experience in the last decade, would see the problems
presented for arbitration in what has been called the 'enlightened' view, but which
many employers feel is inimical, not only to their self-interests, but to the welfare of
their employees, and more broadly, to the general economy.
Id. at 81.
76 Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
77 Id. at 449.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 456 ("The question then is, what is the substantive law to be applied in suits
under § 301(a)? We conclude that the substantive law to apply in suits under § 301(a) is
federal law, which the courts must fashion from the policy of our national labor laws."). This
issue was once the subject of epic debates. A sample of this exhaustive literature includes
Alexander M. Bickel & Harry H. Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process:
The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1957); Paul J. Mishkin, The Federal
"Question" in the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L. REv. 157 (1953); Donald H. Wollett &
Harry H. Wellington, Federalism and Breach ofthe LaborAgreement, 7 STAN. L. REV. 445
(1955). The enforceability of labor agreements in the period before passage of section 301 is
treated in William Gorham Rice, Jr., Collective Labor Agreements in American Law, 44
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Lincoln Mills, the Supreme Court adopted the latter. In ruling to compel the
employer to submit to arbitration, 80 the Court majority treated collective
bargaining agreements as extensions of federal law.81 They believed that
Congress wanted federal courts to develop a unique set of rules for the
enforcement of these contracts.
82
The federal common law of labor arbitration took form three years later in
the Trilogy. Announced by the Supreme Court on June 23, 1960, these rulings
involved three grievance arbitration appeals brought by the same union. In
United Steelworkers ofAmerica v. American Manufacturing Co., involving an
employer's refusal to arbitrate a grievance, the Supreme Court reversed district
and circuit court refusals to order arbitration. 83 In United Steelworkers of
America v. Warrior & GulfNavigation Co., employees were laid-off after part of
their work was subcontracted. Here, again, the Court reversed lower federal
courts and ordered arbitration of the grievances. UnitedSteelworkers ofAmerica
v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp. differed from Warrior & Gulfand American
Manufacturing, because the employer agreed to submit the union's grievance to
arbitration. After the arbitrator's award reduced the termination of several
employees to a ten day suspension, the employer refused to comply with the
award. The Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit's order that denied
enforcement to the arbitrator's award.
As is suggested by its mystical moniker, the Trilogy stated transcendent
principles for federal courts that are called upon, pursuant to section 301, to
HAav. L. REv. 572 (1931); T. Richard Witmer, Collective LaborAgreements in the Courts,
48 YALE L.J. 195 (1938).
80 Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 459 (1957).
81 Id. at 457 ("It is not uncommon for federal courts to fashion federal law where
federal rights are concerned. Congress has indicated by § 301(a) the purpose to follow that
course here.").
82 Justice Douglas provided little practical guidance on this key point when he said,
The Labor Management Relations Act expressly furnishes some substantive law. It
points out what the parties may or may not do in certain situations. Other problems will
lie in the penumbra of express statutory mandates. Some will lack express statutory
sanction but will be solved by looking at the policy of the legislation and fashioning a
remedy that will effectuate that policy. The range of judicial inventiveness will be
determined by the nature of the problem.
Id.
83 United Steelworkers v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564,568 (1960). The appellate court
called the grievance "a frivolous, patently baseless one," United Steelworkers v. Am. Mfg.
Co., 264 F.2d 624, 628 (1959), but the Supreme Court reversed and ordered arbitration,
stating that "[w]hether the moving party is right or wrong is a question of contract
interpretation for the arbitrator .... The courts, therefore, have no business weighing the
merits of the grievance. . . ."Am. Mfg., 363 U.S. at 568.
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enforce arbitration provisions in labor agreements. Here, we highlight two
principles that bear directly on our empirical research. 84 These form the primary
grounds for confirming or vacating an arbitrator's award.
1. The Award Fails To Draw Its Essence from the Collective
Bargaining Agreement
In Enterprise Wheel, the Court stated that the arbitrator's award "is
legitimate only so long as it draws its essence from the collective bargaining
agreement. '85 When the arbitrator dispenses "his own brand of industrial justice"
contrary to the agreement, the "courts have no choice but to refuse enforcement
of the award."
86
2. The Arbitrator Exceeds His Authority
The Enterprise Wheel Court also stated that a "mere ambiguity in the
opinion accompanying an award, which permits the inference that the arbitrator
may have exceeded his authority, is not a reason for refusing to enforce the
award. Arbitrators have no obligation to the court to give their reasons for an
award."'87 An award should not be disturbed unless the arbitrator "has abused the
trust the parties confided in him and has not stayed within the areas marked out
for his consideration." 88 A court should not vacate an award merely because it
disagrees with the arbitrator's construction of the agreement.
89
The Trilogy did more than state principles for evaluating claims to confirfi
or vacate awards. In nearly worshipful tones, Justice Douglas paid tribute to the
special abilities of arbitrators. We also highlight these, because they embody the
special kind of judicial deference that the Supreme Court wanted to accord to
arbitration awards.
84 See infra p. 52 tbl.2.
85 United Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960).
86 Id.





3. The Arbitrator Is Entrusted by the Parties To Resolve Their
Dispute
The American Manufacturing Court noted that the "function of the court is
very limited when the parties have agreed to submit all questions of contract
interpretation to the arbitrator," because it is "the arbitrator's judgment... that
was bargained for."90 Warrior & Gulfalso noted that the arbitrator "is not a
public tribunal imposed upon the parties by superior authority which the parties
are obliged to accept .... He is rather part of a system of self-government
created by and confined to the parties." 91 In this vein, "[t]he labor arbitrator is
usually chosen because of the parties' confidence in his knowledge of the
common law of the shop and their trust in his personal judgment to bring to bear
considerations which are not expressed in the contract as criteria for
judgment." 92
4. The Arbitrator Has Special Insight into Workplace Disputes
The Warrior & GulfCourt lavished praise on arbitrators:
The labor arbitrator performs functions which are not normal to the courts; the
considerations which help him fashionjudgrents may indeed be foreign to the
competence of courts 93 .... The parties expect that his judgment ofa particular
grievance will reflect not only what the contract says but, insofar as the
collective bargaining agreement permits, such factors as the effect upon
productivity of a particular result, its consequence to the morale of the shop, his
judgment whether tensions will be heightened or diminished .... The ablest
judge cannot be expected to bring the same experience and competence to bear
upon the determination of a grievance, because he cannot be similarly
informed.94
5. The Arbitrator Needs Latitude and Flexibility
Even though an arbitrator is not permitted to dispense his own brand of
industrial justice, the Enterprise Wheel Court directed judges to give arbitrators
wide latitude in ruling on grievances:
90 United Steelworkers v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567-68 (1960).
91 United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581 (1960).
92 Id. at 582.
931d. at 581.
94 Id. at 582.
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When an arbitrator is commissioned to interpret and apply the collective
bargaining agreement, he is to bring his informed judgment to bear in order to
reach a fair solution of a problem. This is especially true when it comes to
formulating remedies. There the need is for flexibility in meeting a wide variety
of situations. The draftsmen may never have thought of what specific remedy
should be awarded to meet a particular contingency.
9 5
C. Recent Development of Federal Common Law To Enforce Labor
Agreements: The Public Policy Exception in W.R. Grace and Misco
After the Trilogy, federal courts gradually expanded judicial review to
include the public policy exception. On the one hand, this was nothing but an
extension of the common law doctrine that courts do not enforce terms of an
illegal contract. 96 By this time, however, a series of employment discrimination
laws complicated labor arbitration. 97 To illustrate, an employer in need of laying
off part of its workforce might have to choose between adhering to a collective
bargaining agreement and thereby retain white men while laying off minorities
and women or comply with a consent decree resulting from a race and sex
discrimination lawsuit.
This was the choice that confronted the employer in W.R. Grace & Co. v.
International Union of United ofRubber Workers, Local 759.98 In upholding the
arbitrator's award, the Court sent a seemingly clear message: only in rare
circumstances where "the contract as interpreted by [the arbitrator] violates some
95 United Steelworkers v Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960).
96 See Muschany v. United States, 324 U.S. 49, 66 (1945).
97 The classic statement of this problem appears in David E. Feller, The Coming End of
Arbitration's Golden Age, in ARBITRATION- 976, 29 PROc. NAT'L ACAD. ARB. 97, 109
(1976) ("Arbitration is not an independent force, but a dependent variable, and to the extent
that collective bargaining is diminished as a source of employee rights, arbitration is equally
diminished.").
98 W.R. Grace & Co. v. Int'l Union of United Rubber Workers, Local 759, 461 U.S.
757 (1983). The employer had entered into a consent decree with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission that required the company to maintain its extant proportion of
women and blacks in the work force in the event of layoffs to remedy past sex and race
discrimination at its Corinth, Mississippi plant. A year after entering into the decree, the
employer needed to lay off part of its work force and, consistent with the decree, protected
females and blacks by laying off white males. Having more seniority than the protected
employees, the white males filed a grievance to vindicate this contractual right. After being
compelled by federal courts to arbitrate the grievance, the company lost at arbitration. The
arbitrator ruled that the employer had breached the collective bargaining agreement,
notwithstanding the consent decree, and awarded the affected employees damages rather
than reinstatement. Id. at 762-64.
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explicit public policy" are courts "obliged to refrain from enforcing it."99
However, "[s]uch a public policy.., must be well defined and dominant, and is
to be ascertained 'by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from
general considerations of supposed public interests."'
100
Just four years later, the Court revisited this matter in United Paperworkers
International Union v. Misco, Inc.10 1 An arbitrator reinstated a paper mill worker
who was fired after he was arrested in the company parking lot on a drug
charge. 102 Lower courts vacated the award-and thus, the Company did not
reinstate the grievant-because they believed that itwould violate a public policy
against operating dangerous machinery by drug-users. 10 3 Misco reversed these
rulings, holding that awards may be set aside only if they "would violate 'some
explicit public policy' that is .'well defined and dominant, and is to be
ascertained 'by reference to laws and legal precedents and not from general
considerations of supposed public interests."'
10 4
Misco did more than reaffirm the Trilogy. The decision dealt explicitly with
two other grounds that lower courts used to review awards. We highlight these
because they also bear on our empirical methodology.
10 5
1. The Arbitrator Is Biased or the Award Is Procured by Fraud
While the Trilogy did not contemplate the possibility of bias or fraud, Misco
did in these terms: "[D]ecisions procured by the parties through fraud or through
the arbitrator's dishonesty need not be enforced. '106 The Misco Court believed
that this was a very unlikely basis for vacating an award, noting "there is nothing
of that sort involved in this case." °107 In addition, the Court heavily insulated
awards by instructing judges not to vacate awards with serious errors: "[A]s long
as the arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the contract and acting
within the scope of his authority, that a court is convinced he committed serious
error does not suffice to overturn his decision.
°10 8
9 9 Id. at 766.
10 0 Id. (quoting Muschany, 324 U.S. at 66).
101 United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29 (1987).
10 2 Id. at 34.
103 Id. at 34-35.
104.Id. at 43 (quoting Muschany, 324 U.S. at 66).
10 5 See infra p. 52 tbl.2.
106 Misco, 484 U.S. at 38.
107 Id.
108 Id.
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2. The Arbitrator's Fact-Finding or Procedural Conduct Is
Aberrational
Misco stated a nearly absolute rule against reviewing an arbitrator's fact-
findings: when "only improvident, [or] even silly, factfinding is claimed ...
[t]his is hardly a sufficient basis for disregarding what the agent appointed by the
parties determined to be the historical facts."'1 9 The Court implied in the same
passage, however, that a court might disturb arbitral fact-findings that were
"dishonest."1 0 The Court never explained the difference between silly and
dishonest fact-finding, but in the same discussion, it suggested that the latter
could result from the arbitrator's procedural misconduct:
Even in the very rare instances when an arbitrator's procedural aberrations
rise to the level of affirmative misconduct, as a rule the court must not
foreclose further proceedings by settling the merits according to its own
judgment of the appropriate result, since this step would improperly substitute a
judicial determination for the arbitrator's decision that the parties bargained for
in the collective-bargaining agreement. Instead, the court should simply vacate
the award, thus leaving open the possibility of further proceedings if they are
permitted under the terms of the agreement. The court also has the authority to
remand for further proceedings when this step seems appropriate.111
Still, Misco emphasized that "courts are not authorized to reconsider the
merits of an award even though the parties may allege that the award rests on
errors of fact .... ,"112 And it noted further, "Courts thus do not sit to hear claims
of factual or legal error by an arbitrator as an appellate court does in reviewing
decisions of lower courts."
1 13
D. Current Developments in the Federal Common Law to Enforce Labor
Agreements: Eastern and Garvey
Today the standards for judicial review of labor arbitration awards are almost
entirely settled-certainly, there are no new Trilogy issues for the Court to
decide. The main remaining contention is the public policy exception to award
confirmation. This arose from the Misco Court's refusal to address the argument
109 Id. at 39.
110 Id.
III Id. at 40 n.10.
112 Id. at 36.
113 Id. at 38.
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that "a court may refuse to enforce an award on public policy grounds only when
the award itself violates a statute, regulation, or other manifestation of positive
law, or compels conduct by the employer that would violate such a law." I 14 The
Court recently reconsidered the public policy exception to award confirmation in
Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers, District 17.115 In
addition, because some courts blur the line between "the arbitrator dispens[ing]
his own brand of industrial justice" and the arbitrator's "aberrational" fact-
finding or procedural conduct,"'1 16 Garvey clarified this matter.
In Eastern,117 a coal company fired an employee on two occasions after
finding that he used marijuana while driving heavy machinery on a public
highway. Separate arbitration awards reinstated him, but with restrictions. The
company refused to comply with the second award, contending that it violated a
U.S. Department of Transportation rule stating that "the greatest efforts must be
expended to eliminate the.., use of illegal drugs... by those individuals who
are involved in [certain safety-sensitive positions, including] the operation
of... trucks."1 18 The Supreme Court rejected this argument because DOT rules
also favor rehabilitation of drug users, and no rule expressly prohibits a drug
offender from being employed as a truck driver.
In the same vein, the Court renewed its admonition to all federal courts to
refrain from second-guessing fact findings made by arbitrators. InMajorLeague
Baseball Players' Ass'n v. Garvey, the Ninth Circuit rejected an arbitrator's
factual findings and then resolved the merits of the parties' dispute instead of
114 Id. at 45 n.12.
115 E. Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers, Dist. 17, 531 U.S. 57 (2000).
116 A perfect illustration appears in Garvey v. Roberts, 203 F.3d 580 (9th Cir. 2000):
In the present case, accepting Arbitrator Roberts' reasons as the basis for the award
leads us inexorably to the conclusion that in reaching his decision the arbitrator
'dispensed his own brand of industrial justice.' The arbitrator denied Garvey's claim for
the reason that Ballard Smith's 'testimony' regarding Garvey's contract negotiations at
the 1996 individual claim proceeding was 'in stark contradiction' to the statements
Smith made in his capacity as the San Diego Padres' President and Chief Executive
Officer at the infamous 1986 collusion hearing. Based on this contradiction, the
arbitrator credited the version of events described by Smith at the earlier collusion
hearing and, accordingly, concluded that both Smith's and Garvey's testimony at the
later proceeding was false. To understand why this decision can only be explained as an
attempt by the arbitrator to dispense his own brand of industrial justice, we must review
the context in which he reached his extraordinary conclusion.
Id. at 589.
117 Eastern, 531 U.S. 57 (2000).
118 Id. at 63 (quoting Department of Transportation Act, Pub. L. No. 102-143, § 2(3),
105 Stat. 917, 953 (1991)).
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remanding the case for further arbitration proceedings.11 9 An annoyed Supreme
Court upbraided the appeals court, stating, "We recently reiterated that if an
'arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the contract and acting within
the scope of his authority,' the fact that a 'court is convinced he committed
serious error does not suffice to overturn his decision."'' 120 In a revealing
passage, where the justices deemed the appellate court's ruling "nothing short of
baffling,"'121 the Court pointedly repeated itself, declaring, "But again,
established law ordinarily precludes a court from resolving the merits of the
parties' dispute on the basis of its own factual determinations, no matter how
erroneous the arbitrator's decision."
122
E. Individual Employment Arbitration: The Newest Form of
Workplace Dispute Resolution
Turning to the nonunion form of workplace arbitration, the Supreme Court
has only regulated employer imposition of a requirement to arbitrate employment
disputes. This is called mandatory or compulsory arbitration, because employees
are required as a condition of employment to agree to arbitrate an employment
dispute and waive their right to sue in court. Ten years ago, in Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,123 the Court ruled that the Federal Arbitration
119 Major League Baseball Players Ass'n v. Garvey, 121 S. Ct. 1724 (2001) (per
curiam). The underlying dispute involved a grievance by former star first baseman, Steve
Garvey, alleging that Ballard Smith, CEO of the San Diego Padres, colluded with other
baseball executives to deny him a new contract or a contract extension. Garvey presented a
June 1996 letter from Smith stating that, before the end of the 1985 season, Smith offered to
extend Garvey's contract through the 1989 season, but that the Padres refused to negotiate
with Garvey thereafter due to collusion. The arbitrator did not find this letter credible,
however, because of its "stark contradictions" with Smith's testimony at an earlier hearing.
This factual determination led the arbitrator to deny Garvey's grievance for $3,000,000. Id.
at 1726-27.
120 Id. at 1728 (quoting Eastern, 531 U.S. at 62).
121 Id. In a further rebuke, the Court observed that "the Court of Appeals here recited
these principles, but... it overturned the arbitrator's decision because it disagreed with the
arbitrator's factual findings, particularlythose with respect to credibility." The Ninth Circuit
said it would have credited Smith's 1996 letter, and it concluded that the arbitrator's contrary
conclusion was "irrational" and "bizarre." Id. (citing Garvey v. Roberts, 203 F.3d 580, 590-
91 (9th Cir. 2000).
122 Id. at 1729. Repeating its guidance in Misco, the Court stated again, "When an
arbitrator resolves disputes regarding the application of a contract, and no dishonesty is
alleged, the arbitrator's 'improvident, even silly, factfinding,' does not provide a basis for a
reviewing court to refuse to enforce the award." Id. at 1728.
123 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
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Act applied to the agreement of a securities broker. This meant that Robert
Gilmer, who sued his former employer in federal district court on an age
discrimination claim, was compelled to arbitrate his claim.
1 24
Notably, the Supreme Court limited its holding in Gilmer. Several amici
curiae in support of Gilmer wanted a broader ruling from the Court that most
arbitration clauses in employment agreements are not covered by the FAA. They
contended that the FAA's exclusion section, enacted in 1925 and consisting of
"seamen; railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or
interstate commerce," 125 was meant to exclude all employment contracts.
According to them, this was Congress' way of saying in 1925 that the FAA is a
commercial and not an employment law. The majority refused to rule directly on
this point.126 Because the Court avoided this issue, lower courts became
immersed in it. 127
But the majority decided enough of this issue to give many employers the
impression that arbitration clauses in their employment contracts are enforceable.
This was accomplished when the majority wrote that "we choose to follow the
plain language of the FAA and... therefore hold that § l's exclusionary clause
does not apply to Gilmer's arbitration agreement."' 128 Added to this, the Court
emphatically rejected Gilmer's argument that an arbitration agreement could not
result in a waiver of an individual's access to a judicial forum. 129 Since Gilnier
did not prove that Congress intended to prevent arbitration of age discrimination
claims, the majority reasoned that an employer and employee could agree to
private adjudication of these claims. 130
124 Id. at 23-24.
125 Id. at 25 n.2 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2000)).
126 Id. The Court stated,
Gilmer, however, did not raise the issue in the courts below; it was not addressed there;
and it was not among the questions presented in the petition for certiorari. In any event,
it would be inappropriate to address the scope of the § I exclusion because the
arbitration clause being enforced here is not contained in a contract of employment.
Id.
127 The majority forced this question on lower courts when it said that "we leave for
another day the issue raised by amici curiae." Id.
12 8 Id.
129 The majority based this conclusion on the fact that the Court had ruled in earlier
cases involving arbitration agreements that legal claims arising under a wide variety of
federal statutes were to be arbitrated rather than litigated in court. Id. at 26.
130 The majority said, "we note that the burden is on Gilmer to show that Congress
intended to preclude a waiver of a judicial forum for ADEA claims." Id. The Court
ultimately concluded that Gilmer failed to prove that Congress intended to prohibit the
arbitration of these claims. Id. at 35.
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While Gilmer only dealt with the arbitrability of an ADEA claim, the
majority opinion gave some hint about the standard that courts should apply in
reviewing this kind of arbitration award. Gilmer contended that "judicial review
of arbitration decisions is too limited." 31 The majority rejected his argument by
noting that "although judicial scrutiny of arbitration awards necessarily is
limited, such review is sufficient to ensure that arbitrators comply with the
requirements of the statute at issue."
132
Following Gilmer, many employers adopted employment arbitration
programs.' 33 In addition, most federal circuits extended Gilmer to arbitration
agreements involving other occupations and to other federal anti-discrimination
statutes. 134 The Ninth Circuit defied this trend in Craft v. Campbell Soup Co. 135
To resolve this serious split among appellate courts, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams.136
In that decision, a sales clerk who had signed an employment arbitration
agreement on his employment application sued the company in a California state
court and alleged a variety of discrimination violations. Circuit City petitioned to
remove the matter to federal court, under jurisdiction provided by the FAA, to
enforce the arbitration agreement. The federal district court granted the
Company's motion, and Adams appealed. While his appeal was pending, the
Ninth Circuit issued Craft. The expansive holding of Craft137 divested federal
courts in the circuit of jurisdiction to enforce employment arbitration contracts.
131 Id. at 32 n.4 (quoting Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220,232
(1987)).
132 Id. (quoting Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 482 U.S. at 232).
133 See Bickner et al., supra note 2.
134 See McWilliams v. Logicon, Inc., 143 F.3d 573, 576 (10th Cir. 1998); O'Neil v.
Hilton Head Hosp., 115 F.3d 272,273-74 (4th Cir. 1997); Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109
F.3d 354,357 (7th Cir. 1997); Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1470-72 (D.C.
Cir. 1997); Rojas v. TK Communications, Inc., 87 F.3d 745, 747-48 (5th Cir. 1996);
Asplundh Tree Expert Co. v. Bates, 71 F.3d 592, 597-601 (6th Cir. 1995).
135 Craft v. Campbell Soup Co., 177 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 1999) (per curiam).
136 Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 121 S. Ct. 1302 (2001).
137 Craft, 177 F.3d 1094 (stating that "we hold that the FAA does not apply to labor or
employment contracts.... [W]e have no jurisdiction over Campbell Soup's interlocutory
appeal and this appeal is hereby dismissed."). Craft differed from decisions of other circuits
by examining the legislative history of the FAA. Id. at 1089-91. According to the Craft
court, when Congress enacted the FAA in 1925, it intended that the law apply only to
commercial transactions. Id. at 1090. In addition, when Congress exempted seamen and rail
employees, this was its full extension of commerce powers over the employment
relationship. Thus, when the Craft court interpreted the exclusion section of the FAA in light
of the near vacuum of federal regulation of private-sector employment in 1925, it reasoned
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In deciding to review Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, the Supreme Court
addressed the question reserved by the Gilmer majority--does the FAA's
exclusion of employment contracts in section 1 of "seamen, railroad employees,
or any other class of workers engaged in... interstate commerce" mean that all
other employee contracts are covered by the FAA?
The Circuit City Stores, Inc. majority took a simple approach in ruling that
the FAA's exclusionary language is limited to the occupations expressly
enumerated in section 1. Five justices reasoned that if this exclusion was so
broad as to cover all employment contracts, there would be no point in its
specific reference to seamen and railroad employees. 138 The majority also
applied the canon of ejusdem generis to interpret the breadth of section l's
reference to "any other class of workers engaged in [interstate] commerce."139
The first part of this analysis construed the term "any other class of workers" to
mean that "this ... residual clause should be read to give effect to the terms
'seamen' and 'railroad employees,' and should itself be controlled and defined
by reference to the enumerated categories of workers which are recited just
before it .. .,,140 In treating the remaining ambiguity in section 1B--"engaged
in... [interstate] commerce" - the majority responded indirectly to the Ninth
Circuit's theory of variable federal jurisdiction over private-sector employment
contracts. 141 In dissent, Justice Stevens reasoned that the majority improperly
that the statute's exclusion of employment contracts expanded as federal employment
regulation grew exponentially in the 1930s and later. Id. at 1086-87.
138 See Circuit City Stores, Inc., 121 S. Ct. at 1308, stating, 'This line of reasoning
proves too much, for it would make the § 1 exclusion provision superfluous." The Court
continued, "If all contracts of employment are beyond the scope of the Act under the § 2
coverage provision, the separate exemption for 'contracts of employment of seamen, railroad
employees, or any other class of workers engaged in... interstate commerce, would be
pointless."' Id.
139 Id. "The wording of § I calls for the application of the maxim ejusdem generis, the
statutory canon that 'where general words follow specific words in a statutory enumeration,
the general words are construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to those objects
enumerated by the preceding specific words."' Id. at 1308-09 (quoting 2A NORMAN J.
SINGER, SUTHERLAND ON STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.17(4th ed. 1991)).
140 Id. at 1309.
141 Id. at 1308. The majority declined to offer their own legislative history of the FAA.
Instead, they over-interpreted the difference between statutes that say "affecting commerce,"
"involving commerce," and "engaged in commerce." Id. at 1309. Thus, they drew a negative
inference from the FAA's use of the words "engaged in commerce:"
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
ignored congressional consideration of the unequal bargaining power between
employers and employees when the FAA was enacted.142
Summarizing key developments in the Supreme Court's treatment of
workplace arbitration since the Trilogy, the labor arbitration model is at a mature
stage where little future development should be expected. Courts may vacate
arbitrator rulings, but only in very limited circumstances. In contrast, the
individual employment model is more than forty years behind labor
jurisprudence. Circuit City Stores, Inc. merely decided the threshold issue of
judicial enforcement of agreements to arbitrate employment disputes.
143
Moreover, the Court intends to add its regulatory imprint in this area by deciding
whether an arbitration agreement precludes enforcement of employment
discrimination law by administrative agencies. 144 Although this form of
arbitration is more controversial than the labor model, the Gilmer and Circuit
City Stores, Inc. decisions mean, in a practical sense, that the growing use of this
dispute resolution method will not be stopped by federal courts. In our view, it is
therefore time to accept this reality and devote more attention to the mostly
uncharted territory of court review of awards that result from this process.
Unlike those phrases, however, the general words 'in commerce' and the specific
phrase 'engaged in commerce' are understood to have a more limited reach. In
Allied-Bruce itself the Court said the words 'in commerce' are 'often-found words of
art' that we have not read as expressing congressional intent to regulate to the outer
limits of authority under the Commerce Clause.
Id. (citation omitted).
142 1d. at 1318. He reasoned that if the majorityhad been more honest about confronting
this history, they could not have avoided observing that "the potential disparity in bargaining
power between individual employees and large employers was the source of organized
labor's opposition to the Act, which it feared would require courts to enforce unfair
employment contracts." Id. As for the majority's philosophical preference for strict
construction, Justice Stevens drew from the insight of a foreign jurist:
This case illustrates the wisdom of an observation made by Justice Aharon Barak of the
Supreme Court of Israel. He has perceptively noted that the 'minimalist' judge 'who
holds that the purpose of the statute may be learned only from its language' has more
discretion than the judge 'who will seek guidance from every reliable source.' A
method of statutory interpretation that is deliberately uninformed, and hence
unconstrained, may produce a result that is consistent with a court's own views of how
things should be, but it may also defeat the very purpose for which a provision was
enacted.
Id. (citation omitted).
143 In that sense, it is most analogous to Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills ofAla.,
353 U.S. 448 (1957), which validated federal jurisdiction over pre-arbitration disputes. See
supra notes 76-82.




III. PESEARCH LITERATURE AND METHODS
The autonomy of the labor arbitration system has been investigated since the
Trilogy.145 After more than a decade of experience with the Trilogy's progeny,
the National Academy of Arbitrators concluded that courts achieved a proper
balance in ordering enforcement of labor arbitration agreements 146 and
confirming arbitration awards. 147 As time passed, however, more courts vacated
labor arbitrator rulings. This prompted increasing concern during the 1980s that
courts interfered too much. 148 Today, this research literature offers a bleak
145 See Frances T. Freeman Jalet, JudicialReview ofArbitration: TheJudicial.Attitude,
45 CORNELL L.Q. 519 (1960); Russell A. Smith & Dallas L. Jones, The Impact of the
Emerging FederalLaw of Grievance Arbitration on Judges, Arbitrators, andParties, 52 VA.
L. REv. 831 (1966).
146 In the 1970s and early 1980s, the Academy concluded that courts practiced
deference in accordance with the Trilogy. James P. Kurtz, Arbitration and Federal Rights
Under Collective Bargaining Agreements in 1976, in ARBITRATION-1 977, at 265 app. b,
288 (Barbara D. Dennis & Gerald G. Somers eds., 1978) ("In .general, if the arbitration
award is not [in] manifest disregard of the contract and draws its essence from the contract, it
will be enforced by the courts in routine fashion."). The Committee applauded courts for
being "very sensitive ab6ut not usurping the role of the arbitrator in reaching a final and
binding decision of a contract dispute." Id. at 309.:
14 7 See Edgar A. Jones, Jr.,A Meditation on LaborArbitration and 'His Own Brand of
Industrial Justice', in ARBITRATION 1982: CONDUCTOFTHE HEARING 1,6 (James L. Stem &
Barbara D. Dennis eds., 1983) (concluding that the "courts of appeals have ... interpret[ed]
the 'essence' rationale in such a manner as to iniplement the determined effort of the
Supreme Court to surround labor arbitration and the parties' collective bargaining agreement
with the strongest possible measure of insulation from the displacing intrusions of courts").
148 One of the earliest expressions of concern about judicial review of labor arbitration
process is David E. Feller, supra note 97, at 97. This theme was amplified in Eva Robins,
The Presidential Address: Threats to Arbitration, in ARBITRATION ISSUES FOR THE 1980S I
(James L. Stem & Barbara D. Dennis eds., 1982). For more recent considerations, see
Michael H. Gottesman, How the Courts and the NLRB View Arbitrators' Awards, in
ARBITRATION 1985: LAWAND PRACTICE 168 (Walter J. Gershenfeld ed., 1986); Michael H.
Gottesman, Enforceability ofAwards: A Union Viewpoint, in ARBITRATION 1988: EMERGING
ISSUES FOR THE 1990S 88 (Gladys W. Gruenberg ed., 1989); Stephen R. Reinhardt,
Arbitration and the Courts: Is the Honeymoon Over?, in ARBITRATION 1987: THEACADEMY
AT FORTY 25 (Gladys W. Gruenberg ed., 1988); Jan Vetter, Enforceability ofAwards: Public
Policy Post-Misco, in ARBITRATION 1988: EMERGING ISSUES FOR THE 1990S 75 (Gladys W.
Gruenberg ed., 1989). See also William B. Gould IV, JudicialReview ofLabor Arbitration
Awards-Thirty Years of the Steelworkers Trilogy. The Aftermath of AT&T and Misco, 64
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 464 (1989).
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assessment of federal court adherence to the Trilogy. Professors Theodore St.
Antoine 149 and David Feller 150 represent this view.
This criticism is based on textual analysis of selected appellate court
decisions that are perceived as influences on lower courts. There is a sound logic
in this kind of analysis, but it also raises questions. First, how much are district
courts influenced by these appellate decisions? This is fair to ask, because
vacatur cases are fact-specific. Thus, the precedential value of appellate decisions
may be limited. Second, federal court critics rarely use a quantitative approach,
but their conclusions are phrased in statistical terms, such as trends and
tendencies. What is the aggregate behavior of courts that review labor and
employment arbitration awards?
We use a different approach. We examine the outcome of all reported court
decisions involving an appealed workplace arbitration award. Using keyword
searches on Westlaw's Internet service, we generated an initial list of decisions
that were likely to meet pre-determined criteria for inclusion in a research
database. 151 Three criteria were used: the decision (1) was made either by a
149 Theodore J. St. Antoine, The Changing Role ofLabor Arbitration, 76 IND. L.J. 83
(2001):
In the halcyon days following the Second World War, labor arbitrators operated in
a largely self-contained domain where the collective bargaining agreement reigned
almost supreme. External civil law in the form of statutes and common-law court
decisions seldom intruded. Then, as a spate of civil rights statutes and other laws aimed
at protecting individual employee rights in the workplace poured forth in the 1960s and
1970s, arbitrators construing labor contracts were drawn ineluctably into the
interpretation and application of this overlapping legislation. That in turn led to
heightened judicial scrutiny of arbitral awards in both union and nonunion contexts.
Not surprisingly, increased judicial review of awards dealing with statutes whetted
many courts' appetites for going further and taking a closer look at the area previously
left mostly to itself-awards concerning collective agreements. At least that was true of
those awards which in the courts' eyes might be seen to contravene some sort of 'public
policy.'
Id. at 102.
150 David E. Feller, Putting Gilmer Where It Belongs: The FAA 's Labor Exemption, 18
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 253 (2000):
Labor arbitration was... put on a higher plane than arbitration of commercial disputes
under the FAA. Yet, as a result of the elevation of FAA arbitration in later years and the
misapplication of Enterprise Wheel, when it comes to enforcement of awards, the
reverse is now true. Labor arbitration is given less respect than commercial arbitration.
Id. at 282.
151 For the labor-management database, we used the keyword search "TRILOGY &
ARBITRATOR & AWARD & VACAT! OR CONFIRM! & UNION." For the individual
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federal district or circuit court 152 pursuant to some form of federal jurisdiction, 5
3
(2) involved award confirmation or vacatur, and (3) had a private-sector
employer and union or individual employee. A decision was not included if it
failed to meet any of these criteria. 154 Pre-arbitration disputes were the most
common cases that were excluded from this search. By ruling on whether a
workplace dispute is arbitrable, these decisions involved a separate facet of
judicial review of workplace dispute resolution. They did not present, however,
the issue of court review of the arbitrator's ruling.
The date of decision also determined inclusion in the database. In a
previously published study, we analyzed judicial review of labor arbitration
awards from June 1960 through late June 1991.155 For labor-management cases,
we began our current research with the endpoint in our prior database. This
allowed us to compare federal court behavior during the 1990s and early part of
this decade with an earlier period. Thus, our search included cases decided from
July 1991 through late March 2001.
For the new database on individual employment rights, we used May 14,
1991 as a cutoff. This was done to restrict our search to cases decided after
Gilmer. During our search, we found one pre-Gilmer decision that reviewed an
award and included it because this case was indistinguishable from post-Gilmer
decisions. 156
employment rights database, we used "GILMER & ARBITRATOR & AWARD & VACAT!
OR CONFIRM!."
152 Therefore, our primary search was conducted in the "ALLFEDS" database.
However, when we extended our search by keyciting Enterprise Wheel, some state cases
reviewing arbitration awards appeared in our list. Since these decisions did not involve
federal jurisdiction, they were excluded from the sample. E.g., City of Chicago v. Water Pipe
Extension, Bureau of Eng'g Laborers' Local No. 1092,707 N.E.2d 257 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999).
153 The labor-management cases were reviewed under section 301 of the Taft-Hartley
Act, while individual employment rights cases were often reviewed under the Federal
Arbitration Act. However, in the latter group, some cases arose under other jurisdictional
grounds. E.g., McNulty v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 871 F. Supp. 567 (E.D.N.Y. 1994)
(arising under the Jury System Improvements Act of 1978, 28 U.S.C. § 1875 (1994)).
154 E.g., Water Pipe Extension, 707 N.E.2d at 257.
155 Michael H. LeRoy & Peter Feuille, The Steelworkers Trilogy and Grievance
Arbitration Appeals: How the Federal Courts Respond, 13 INDUS. REL. L.J. 78, 98 (1992).
This research analyzed 1148 federal district court decisions and 480 federal circuit court
decisions that resulted in a court order which compelled or denied arbitration or which
enforced or vacated an arbitrator's award in whole or in part. These decisions were published
after June 23, 1960 and before July 1, 1991.
156 Booth v. Hume Pub'g, Inc., 902 F.2d 925 (1 Ith Cir. 1990) (decided June 5, 1990).
Gilmer was decided on May 13, 1991. Although we used Gilmer as cutoff for nonunion
cases in the same way we used the date of the Trilogy in our 1991 study, we also realized
that Gilmer did not set standards for reviewing arbitration awards. Since the Supreme Court
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We expanded our search for cases that met the inclusion criteria. We added
cases that were cited in these decisions if they met the parameters for inclusion
and did not duplicate our initial search. Next, we "KeyCited" each decision in
our list to add appropriate but overlooked cases.
Finally, we "KeyCited" the Supreme Court's Enterprise Wheel (the Trilogy
case that dealt specifically with judicial review of labor arbitration awards) and
Gilmer decisions to ensure that our other search methods did not overlook other
appropriate cases. All three procedures added unduplicated cases. While the
samples may not contain the universe of reported arbitration award cases, they
were produced by a thorough research methodology.
We used a lengthy survey form for each qualifying case. The surveys
revealed the attributes of each case, including information about the arbitration
facts, reasons for the losing party's appeal, the court's ruling, and the basis for
the order. 157 The resulting data was coded into variables (e.g., vacatur or
confirmation of the award, federal circuit in which a court made a decision). We
then analyzed the data using SPSS, a statistical program for the social sciences.
has not yet decided a Trilogy analog forjudicial review of arbitration awards that result from
this process, we saw no good reason to exclude this pre-Gilmer decision.
157 Our information was limited to the published facts and reasoning in each decision.
Thus, we had no access to the parties' contract, the arbitration award (except as summarized
by the court decision), any evidence adduced at arbitration, or the record produced in district
and/or circuit court. This prevents us from offering our own normative judgments of any
arbitration decisions or court rulings (i.e., we are unable to conclude how justified or
ill-advised these specific decisions and rulings were). This background is important because
it explains our inability to judge whether a particular court decision is consistent or




The first part of our analysis examines the labor-management model. Table 1
summarizes 1244 district court decisions and 543 appellate court decisions from
1960-2001.
A. Finding 1
Courts have confirmed awards at a consistent rate throughout this forty-one
year history. District courts confirmed 71.8% of the 1008 cases decided from
1960-1991, and 70.3% of the 232 decisions in the past decade. 158 Appellate'
courts behaved about the same, confirming 70.5% of awards from 1960-1991,
and 66.4% in the recent period.
B. Finding 2
Comparing recent decisions with earlier ones, the award confirmation rate
dropped substantially in district courts in the Fourth and Eighth Circuits, but rose
in the Ninth Circuit. Although federal courts in the aggregate were consistent in
their tendency to confirm awards, their behavior varied by region. This is most
evident among district courts in circuits with large sub-samples. In the past
decade the confirmation rate for these courts increased in the Ninth Circuit by
thirteen'percentage points. Although the Tenth Circuit had only seven award
confirmation cases from 1991-200 1, it confirmed all of them. Even adjusting for
this very small sample size, the 45.8 percentage points increase in the
confirmation rate by courts in this circuit is noteworthy.
158 See infra p. 50 tbl.1 bottom row.
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Table 1
Federal Court Confirmation of Labor Arbitration Awards
July 1991-March 2001 (Bold Font)/June 1960-June 1991 (Standard Font)
Court Confirms Award Union Wins District Appellate
(by Circuit) 159  Award Decisions Decisions
Ist Cir. (1991-2001) 6/7 (83.3%) 6/7 (85.7%) 4/5 (80.0%)
1st Cir. (1960-1991) 69/94 (73.4%) 20/29 (69.0%)
2nd Cir. (1991-2001) 33/41 (80.5%) 35/41 (85.7%) 8/8 (100.0%)
2nd Cir. (1960-1991) 128/158 (81%) 20/32 (62.5%)
3 rd Cir. (1991-2001) 22/25 (88%) 21/25 (84%) 3/7 (42.9%)
3rd Cir. (1960-1991) 118/148 (79.8%) 32/39 (82.1%)
4 1h Cir. (1991-2001) 17/20 (88.2%) 9/20 (45%) 9/13 (69.2%)
4th Cir. (1960-1991) 23/38 (60.5%) 8/13 (61.5%)
5 th Cir. (1991-2001) 8/10 (80.0%) 7/10 (70.0%) 2/5 (40.0%)
5th Cir. (1960-1991) 57/96 (59.4%) 41/55 (74.5%)
6 th Cir. (1991-2001) 41/47 (87.2%) 28/47 (59.5%) 21/31 (67.7%)
6th Cir. (1960-1991) 80/111(72.1%) 39/62 (62.9%)
7 th Cir. (1991-2001) 13/15 (86.7%) 12/15 (80%) 4/5 (80%)
7th Cir. (1960-1991) 74/101(73.3%) 30/43 (69.8%)
8 th Cir. (1991-2001) 21/24 (87%) 14/24 (58.4%) 9/19 (47.4%)
8th Cir. (1960-1991) 59/76 (77.6%) 35/46 (76.1%)
9 th Cir. (1991-2001) 15/20 (75.0%) 15/20 (75.0%) 12/15 (80.0%)
9th Cir. (1960-1991) 67/108 (62.0%) 47/66 (71.2%)
10th Cir. (1991-2001) 6/7 (85.7%) 7/7 (100%) 2/2 (100%)
10th Cir. (1960-1991) 13/24 (54.2%) 11/17 (64.7%)
11th Cir. (1991-2001) 11/11 (100%) 5/11 (45.5%) 2/5 (40.0%)
11th Cir. (1960-199 1) 9/19 (47.4%) 6/11 (54.5%)
12th Cir. (1991-2001) 4/5 (80.0%) 4/5 (80.0%) 1/1 (100%)
12th Cir. (1960-1991) 27/35 (77.1%) 11/14 (78.6%)
Total (1991-2001) 163/232 (70.3%) 77/116 (66.4%)Total (1960-1991) 724/1008 301/427 (70.5%)
(71.8%)
Conversely, the confirmation rate dropped by 15.5 and 19.2 percentage
points respectively in the Fourth and Eighth Circuits. Meanwhile, district courts
159 First Circuit (ME, NH, MA, RI), Second Circuit (NY, CT, VT), Third Circuit
(PA, NJ, DE), Fourth Circuit (MD, WV, VA, NC, SC), Fifth Circuit (MS, LA, TX),
Sixth Circuit (MI, OH, KY, TN), Seventh Circuit (IL, IN, WI), Eighth Circuit (AR, MO,
IA, MN, ND, SD, NE), Ninth Circuit (CA, AL, HA, OR, WA, ID, MT, NE, AZ), Tenth
Circuit (CO, WY, UT, KS, OK, NM), Eleventh Circuit (GA, FL, AL).
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in two circuits where a high number of cases occur had fairly constant rates over
these periods. Confirmation rates for courts in the Second and Third Circuits
increased by 4.7 and 4.2 percentage points.
C. Finding 3
Awards that were challenged in federal courts almost always ruled in favor
of a union. Unions prevailed in 84.9% of the arbitration awards.
160
D. Finding 4
During the recent decade, confirmation rates varied only moderately by the
type of issue upon which awards were challenged. 161 The most effective
argument for contesting an award was that it failed to draw its essence from the
agreement. District courts confirmed 70.4% of these awards. The least effective
argument for vacating an award was that the arbitrator made a fact-finding error.
In cases raising this argument, the award enforcement rate was 82.1%. The
confirmation rate for awards challenged on public policy grounds fell in this
range. District courts confirmed 71.4% of these awards. The range between these
extremes was not large.
160 Awards in 197 of the 232 underlying arbitrations (eighty-five percent) ruled in favor
of unions. This result is similar to our earlier study that found unions prevailed in eighty
percent of appealed awards. See Peter Feuille & Michael LeRoy, Grievance Arbitration
Appeals in the Federal Courts: Facts and Figures, ARB. J., Mar. 1990, at 35, 42.
161 See infra p. 52 tbl.2. We call attention to the fact that the overall confirmation rate is
lower than the rate for any of the five issue categories that appear in Table 2. This odd result
is explained by the fact that our computation of the overall confirmation rate included cases
in which courts did not state the specific issue for appealing an award. SPSS treated these as
missing cases when we analyzed sub-samples of decisions where courts specificallyreported
the Trilogy issues upon which an award appeal was based. Three percent of the cases in the
entire sample were treated as missing for these issue analyses.
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Table 2
Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards
(July 1991-March 2001)
Confirmation of A wards by Trilogy Issues
Court Confirms Award
Union Wins District Appellate
Award Court Court
Total Appealed 197/232 (84.9%) 163/232 (70.3%) 77/116 (66.4%)
Awards
Basis for Challenging Award
Arbitrator exceeded 82/97 (84.5%) 74/97 (76.2%) 29/43 (67.4%)
authority
Award did not draw
its essence from
collective bargaining 1361152 (89.5%) 107/152 (70.4%) 53/80 (66.3%)
agreement
Arbitrator made 22/28 (78.6%) 23/28 (82.1%) 7/13 (53.9%)
fact-finding error
Award violated a 71/84 (84.5%) 60/84 (71.4%) 30/41 (73.2%)
public policy
Award procured 4/8 (50.0%) 6/8 (75.0%) 0
by bias or fraud
* Since some cases raised two or more issues, figures do not sum to sample size.
Next, we examine court review of employment arbitration awards. 162
E. Finding A
Challenges to employment arbitration awards are a recent development. Our
search produced only fifty award-confirmation cases. Among the thirty-four
district court decisions for which data was available, 163 almost one-third (34.8%)
occurred in 2000 (no cases have been reported yet in 2001). Another thirteen
percent were handed down in 1999. Thus, about half of the decisions in this
sample were decided since 1999. The remaining decisions were scattered from
162 See infra pp. 54-56 tbl.3.
163 We located twenty-three district court cases. Another eleven cases resulted from
circuit decisions that contained a summary of arguments and rulings made in an unpublished
district court ruling. Usually, the decision year for these unpublished cases was not disclosed
in the appellate opinion.
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1991-1998, with one peak occurring in 1997 (17.4%). About two-fifths (43.8%)
of the appellate decisions occurred in 2000 or 2001.
F. Finding B
Approximately two-thirds of these cases (61.8%) involved the securities
industry. This result was not unexpected since these employers have been at the
forefront of utilizing individual employment arbitration. 164 Thus, our sample
contained some atypical employment disputes. For example, two cases involved




The sample contained a substantial amount of employment discrimination
claims. About 56% of the cases involved Title VII claims (all but one
complained of race and/or sex discrimination), and 26% of the cases had ADEA
claims. Almost 40% of the employees in these disputes were female, and 18%
were African-American.
H. Finding D
Terminations where the employer's action triggered most of the arbitrations
(81.3%). Pay and bonus issues trailed far behind (12.5%), as did demotions
(6.3%).
I. Finding E
Employers prevailed in 67.6% of the awards. In the 26% of awards in which
employees received money, the median was $90,355.
164 See REGISTERED REPRESENTATIVES, supra note 18. The GAO study reported that
only eighteen employment arbitrations occurred in the securities industry between August
1990 and December 1992. During 1991 and 1992, 1110 arbitrations occurred, most of which
dealt with customer complaints.
165 Brown v. Coleman Co., 220 F.3d 1180 (10th Cir. 2000); Prudential Bache Sec., Inc.
v. Tanner, 72 F.3d 234 (1st Cir. 1995).
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J. Finding F
Employees were much more likely than employers to sue to vacate an award
(76% to 24%).
K. Finding G
Employers won about 67% of these award challenge cases before district
courts and 63% before courts of appeal.
Table 3










Title VII [Federal] 13/23 56.5%
ADEA [Federal] 6/23 26.1%
ADA [Federal] 2/23 8.7%
Other [Federal] 2/23 8.7%
Unjust Dismissal [State] 3/19 15.8%
Emotional Distress [State] 3/19 15.8%
Defamation [State] 2/19 10.5%
Fraud [State] 2/19 10.5%
Antidiscrimination [State] 5/19 26.3%
Breach of Contract [State] 4/19 21.1%














Who Challenges Award in Federal District Court *****
Employee 25/33 75.8%
Employer 8/33 24.2%

















Who Wins Award Challenpe in Federal Anneals Court
Employee
Employer
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L. Finding H
Courts confirmed a high percentage of employment awards. Respectively,
district and appellate courts enforced 85% and 81% of challenged awards.
M. Finding I
District and appellate courts in the First and Second Circuits enforced fifteen
of nineteen awards, for a confirmation rate of 79%. This rate was lower than the
Federal Appeals Court Ruling on District Court Decision
Affirm Decision 9/16 56.3%
Affirm Decision in Part 2/16 12.5%
Reverse Decision 5/16 31.3%
Sample Characteristics
Federal District Court Decisions 34
Federal Appellate Court Decisions 16
Challenged Awards
Awards Appealed to Federal Courts: 34
* Examples include telecommunications, consumer products, and law firms.
** Court decisions inconsistently reported this information, but this incomplete
data is included to show the minimum extent that women and African-Americans
were compelled to arbitrate their employment disputes.
*** Plaintiffs sometimes cited multiple causes of action; we coded the primary
cause of action.
**** Two cases did not report the adverse action taken or alleged to be taken by
the employer.
***** In one of the 34 cases, both parties challenged the award.
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rest of the nation, where district and appellate courts confirmed twenty-eight of
thirty-one awards, for a rate of 90%. 166
V. BEHIND THE NUMBERS: TEXTUAL ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL COURT
DECISIONS
A. What Is an Appropriate Range of.Award Confirmation Rates for
Federal Courts?
Our methodology questions the conventional approach for assessing judicial
review of arbitration awards. The conventional method relies heavily upon
textual analysis of selected appellate cases. We believe this approach can be
improved by statistical analysis of a large number of court decisions. We also
recognize, however, that a study based solely on statistics is likely to disembody
vital information about judicial behavior. In this part of our analysis, we analyze
why some courts vacated awards. We agree with the widely held view that some
judges exceed the boundaries of judicial review set forth in the Trilogy, but we
also believe that two other reasons contribute to the vacatur results presented
above: the arbitrator's faulty decisionmaking or conduct, and the arbitration
system.
Just as previous studies of judicial review of arbitration awards rely too
heavily on textual analysis of a few cases, a statistical study could disembody
judicial decisionmaking by examining only numbers. In this Part of our
discussion of empirical findings, we offer a matrix to explain the statistical trends
that are reported as findings. This framework links our statistical findings in Part
IV, with our ultimate conclusions in Part VI.
This framework differs from the research mainstream that treats a court
decision to vacate an award as an external threat to the arbitration system. We
believe it is better to consider the full range of empirical possibilities to deduce
reasonable parameters for award confirmation rates. In short, objective guidelines
should be in place before evaluating federal court adherence to the Trilogy and
FAA standards. These boundaries should reflect the paradox built into judicial
review standards for arbitration: the arbitrator's award should be reviewed with
great deference, but not automatically confirmed.
166 We coded one case as having a partially confirmed award (McWilliams v. Logicon,
No. CIV. A. 95-2500-GTV, 1997 WL 383150 (D. Kan. June 4, 1997)). The arbitration
involved a disability discrimination claim against the employer. McWilliams, 1997 WL
383150, at *1. The districtcourt confirmed the award but ordered the employer to pay the
arbitrator's fees. McWilliams, 1997 WL 383150, at *1. Since the court upheld the merits of
the award, McWilliams, 1997 WL 383150, at *2, we treated the case as an award
confirmation for this computation.
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What does this mean in statistical terms? There is no ideal figure or range,
but the process of elimination narrows the possibilities for reasonable estimates.
The easiest confirmation rates to eliminate are 100% and 0%. The former would
mean that courts rubber stamp arbitration rulings. 167 Zero percent is just as
unacceptable. 1
68
Next, confirmation rates ranging from 1% to 49% would clearly indicate
judicial failure to implement the deferential standards promulgated by the
Supreme Court. 169 If courts failed to enforce a majority of awards, this
heightened scrutiny would convert arbitrations into pre-trial maneuvers. The
main economic reasons for parties to use arbitration-comparative speed,
efficiency, and procedural simplicity17 0-would be lost. The widespread use
today of labor and individual arbitration is compelling evidence for rejecting
these confirmation rates as a desirable range of judicial outcomes.
167 E.g., Matteson v. Ryder Sys., 99 F.3d 108, 113 (3d Cir. 1996) ("[Tjhe courts are
neither entitled nor encouraged simply to 'rubber stamp' the interpretations and decisions of
arbitrators."); Leed Architectural Prod., Inc. v. United Steelworkers, Local 6674, 916 F.2d
63, 65 (2d Cir. 1990) ("Effusively deferential language notwithstanding, the courts are
neither entitled nor encouraged simply to 'rubber stamp' the interpretations and decisions of
arbitrators. This great deference, however, is not the equivalent of a grant of limitless
power.").
168 See Hawaii Teamsters and Allied Workers Union, Local 996 v. United Parcel Serv.,
241 F.3d 1177, 1184 (9th Cir. 2001):
All of these components-statutes, case decisions, principles of contract law, practices,
assumptions, understandings, the common law of the shop and "the industrial common
law"--are part of what is known as the federal labor law. Moreover, it is the general
understanding, indeed it is the keystone of the national labor policy announced in the
Steelworkers Trilogy, that skilled labor arbitrators, rather than judges, are better
positioned and equipped to identify and to apply the common law of the shop.
Id. at 1184 (quoting McKinney v. Emery Air Freight Corp., 954 F.2d 590, 595 (9th Cir.
1992)).
169 Id. at 1182 ("[E]ven if we were to disagree with the arbitrator's approach, it is not
our task to intrude into the arbitration process and substitute ourjudgment for his. Our role
here is severely limited compared to our routine de novo review of a district court's
interpretation of contract language.")
170 See Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Sys., Inc., 238 F.3d 549 (4th Cir. 2001).
See also United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, where the Court
stated,
So, too, where it is contemplated that the arbitrator will determine remedies for contract
violations that he finds, courts have no authority to disagree with his honest judgment
in that respect. If the courts were free to intervene on these grounds, the speedy




* Applying the reasoning of George L. Priest and Benjamin Klein, 171 we also
reject a 50% confirmation rate. Their model predicts that the tendency for
plaintiffs to prevail at trial approaches a probability of 50% as the fraction of
cases going to trial approaches zero. 172 When a legal rule or the adjudicator
clearly favors one side, rational disputants avoid the high transaction costs of
litigation. 173 Thus, only cases in which the parties disagree on the predicted
outcome of an adjudication go to trial. 174
If courts vacated 50% of arbitration awards, losers at arbitration would be
less inclined to abide by their promise to accept these rulings as final and
binding.175 Thus, losing parties would be encouraged to treat arbitrations merely
as pre-trial maneuvers, thereby defeating the purpose of this dispute resolution
method. 176
This leaves a range of 51% to 99% as candidates for optimal confirmation
rates. It is reasonable to reject confirmation rates between 51% and 59% as
undesirably low. Judicial behavior in this range would also invite sore losers to
appeal awards. At the other extreme, confirmation rates between 91% and 99%
would imply too much judicial deference to clearly erroneous rulings or awards
that violate a public policy.
We therefore conclude that award confirmation rates ranging from 60% to
89% reflect judicial deference without abandonment of reviewing
responsibilities. This framework establishes a reasonably objective basis for
reaching conclusions about federal court performance under the Trilogy and
171 George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection ofDisputes for Litigation, 13 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984). See also Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Gettingto No: A Study
of Settlement Negotiations and the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 MICH. L. REv. 319
(1991), where the authors comment,
A trial is a failure. Although we celebrate it as the centerpiece of our system ofjustice,
we know that trial is not only an uncommon method of resolving disputes, but a
disfavored one. With some notable exceptions, lawyers, judges, and commentators
agree that pretrial settlement is almost always cheaper, faster, and better than trial.
Id. at 320.
172 See Priest & Klein, supra note 171, at 19-20.
173 Id. at 16.
174 Id.
175 E.g., Office & Prof]l Employees Int'l Union, Local 2 v. Washington Metro. Area
Transit Auth., 724 F.2d 133, 138 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ("Congress chose words which create the
expectation of [award] finality, of decisions not subject to judicial second-guessing.").
176 See Willemijn Houdstermaatschappij, BV v. Standard Microsystems Corp., 103
F.3d 9, 12 (2d Cir. 1997) (noting .'[a]rbitration awards are subject to very limited review in
order to avoid undermining the twin goals of arbitration, namely, settling disputes efficiently
and avoiding long and expensive litigation."') (quoting Folkways Music Publishers, Inc. v.
Weiss, 989 F.2d 108, 111 (2d Cir. 1993)).
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FAA. In addition, this framework allows consideration of inputs in the award
review process that generate undesirably low or high confirmation rates.
Our logic is supported by a small and emerging body of empirical research
on the decision making behavior of federal courts that exercise appellate review.
The most similar research is Professor James J. Brudney's analysis of 1224
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) decisions from 1986 to 1993 that were
appealed by employers or unions to federal courts.177 In these cases, in which the
Board ruled that an employer or union committed one or more unfair labor
practices under the National Labor Relations Act. Similar to arbitration awards,
these cases involved either an employer or a union who lost a final order that
resulted from an adjudicatory process, and appealed that outcome to a federal
court. 178
Professor Brudney examined the NLRB's own evidence of Board orders that
were enforced by federal courts. In the aggregate from 1960-1992, federal courts
fully enforced 66.9% of NLRB orders. 179 The rate of success varied, however, in
this lengthy period: "it was below 60 percent in the 1960s, rose to 72% in the
early 1970s before declining slightly to 65 percent in the early 1980s, and was
above 75% from 1985-1992."180 Expanding on the Board's own research,
Professor Brudney analyzed specific issues and outcomes that unions and
employers appealed.
In a key general finding, federal courts reversed 19.7% of Board rulings that
found employers liable for committing unfair labor practices. 181 The reversal rate
for Board findings of union liability was 14.7%.182 Restating these results in
terms of a confirmation rate, we note that federal courts enforced nearly 80% of
Board orders finding an employer liable, and about 85% in cases of union
liability.
Additional support for our suggested empirical range is provided by a study
of appealed patent adjudications by Professor Kimberly A. Moore. 183 She
studied the recent litigation explosion of patent cases tried either before a judge
177 James J. Brudney, A Famous Victory: Collective Bargaining Protections and the
Statutory Aging Process, 74 N.C. L. REv. 939 (1996).
178 Under the NLRA, as amended, "the courts of appeals are authorized to review,
enforce, and set aside the Board's decisions." Id. at 943 n.13.
179 Id. at 970 n.93 (citing 25 NLRB ANN. REP. tbl.19 (1960) through 57 NLRB ANN.
REP. tbl.19 (1992)).
180 Id.
181 Id. at 976 tbl.3.
182 Id.
183 Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases-An Empirical Peek Inside
the Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REv. 365 (2000).
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or jury. Although jury trials have been provided by federal law since 1790,184
there has been a presumption that these cases are too complex for lay people
empaneled to act as a jury. At various times from 1940 through 1970, less than
3% of patent adjudications were tried before ajury, but from 1997 to 1999, juries
decided 59% of these adjudicated disputes.1
85
The main thrust of Professor Moore's study was to see whether federal
appeals courts were more inclined to overturn verdicts by juries than judges. 186
Contrary to the expectation that appeals courts overturn a greater percentage of
jury verdicts, she found the same affirmance rate-7 8%--for judge and jury
verdicts. 1
87
We also found an empirical study on state appellate review of death penalty
sentencing which broadly mirrored results for federal courts. 188 Professors John
Blume and Theodore Eisenberg analyzed cases of direct appeals of death penalty
sentences reported on Westlaw from 1995 to 1997 for twenty-one states. 189
These states were analyzed because they accounted for 3112 of the 3208 state
prisoners (97%) under a death sentence as of December 31, 1996.190 The authors
compared the death penalty reversal rate for persons who were re-sentenced to
death after prevailing on an initial appeal with those who were not re-
sentenced. 191 By dividing the sample like this, the authors were testing the
assumption that persons who are re-sentenced to die are more "death-worthy"
than others.192 They found that nine of fifty-seven re-sentencing convictions
(16%) were reversed on appeal compared to reversal in 154 of the 754 cases
(20%) not involving re-sentencings.193
How, do these empirical studies of appellate court review inform our
analysis? First, although they generally confirm the abstract range we present
here, they also imply a more precise range for appropriate award confirmation
rates. The lowest aggregate affirmance rate was nearly 67% for NLRB orders
184 Id. at 366 n.3 (citing Act of April 10, 1790, ch.7, § 4, 1 Stat. 109, 111).
185 Id. at 366.
1861d. at 367.
187 Id. at 397.
188 John Blume & Theodore Eisenberg, Judicial Politics, Death Penalty Appeals, and
Case Selection: An Empirical Study, 72 S. CAL. L. REv. 465 (1999).
189 Id. at 480-81.
190 Id.
191 Id. at 490.
192 Id. ("The subsequent re-sentencing to death, the subject of appeal in our data, could
be taken as some evidence that these cases are death-worthy or that the arguments against
death were not forcefully marshalled.").
193 Id.
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enforced by federal courts, 194 while the highest affirmance rates were
approximately 84% for re-sentenced death penalties 195 and 85% for NLRB
orders that imposed liability on employers. 1
96
Second, the NLRB and patent studies involved legal disputes where there is
a presumption that the original tribunal has subject matter expertise. This is
similar to the Trilogy's assumption that labor arbitrators are better suited than
judges to resolve grievances. 197 Appellate courts are expected to engage in a very
narrow review in appeals of NLRB and patent-court orders. 198 In sum, studies of
these appeals suggest that courts may behave consistently across a range of
subject-matter appeals as a function of the highly deferential legal standard they
are compelled to apply.
Finally, these federal judiciary studies remind us that these courts are neither
labor nor patent tribunals, but courts of general subject matter jurisdiction under
Article I of the U.S. Constitution. 199 Their behavior in reviewing arbitration
awards may be influenced by their general role in adjudicating different types of
specialized disputes in which these courts readily acknowledge that they lack
subject matter expertise. In sum, whatever a judge may learn about reviewing a
194 Brudney, supra note 177, at 970 n.93.
195 Blume & Eisenburg, supra note 188, at 490.
196 Brudney, supra note 177, at 976. See infra pp. 54-56 tbl.3.
197 See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581-82
(1960).
198 Federal courts do not disturb the NLRB's fact findings as long as they are supported
by substantial evidence. E.g., Geske & Sons v. NLRB, 103 F.3d 1366, 1375 (7th Cir. 1997)
("As long as the Board's determination is premised on substantial evidence, its conclusion is
both valid and binding on this court."). The Board's legal conclusions, however, are
reviewed de novo. E.g., NLRB v. CWI of Md., Inc., 127 F.3d 319,330 (4th Cir. 1997). In a
similar vein, federal courts in patent cases have reviewed questions of law "without
deference to the views of the Agency." E.g., In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1568 (Fed. Cir.
1995). However, with regard to questions of fact, courts defer to the Patent Office unless its
findings are "clearly erroneous." Id.
199 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, provides in pertinent part, "The judicial Power of the
United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the
Congress may, from time to time, ordain and establish." Although Article III powers are very
broad, they are limited by the cases and controversies requirement. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2,
cl. I. As a practical matter, basic concerns for federalism also limit federal courtjurisdiction
when the legislative or executive branches "ha[ve] the power of ultimate determination."
Comment, The Distinction Between Legislative and Constitutional Courts, 43 YALE L.J. 316
(1933). The point is that even though federal courts have finite jurisdiction, it is so
comprehensive that no judge can be a subject-matter expert for every dispute. Thus, when
Congress delegates an adjudicatory or fact-finding function to an administrative agency,
while reserving a limited reviewing role for courts, it is natural for judges to be reluctant to
second-guess these original jurisdiction fora.
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technical case in patent or labor law may be imported to disputes involving
workplace arbitration.
200
B. A Matrix for Analyzing the Range of Award Confirmation Rates
In Chart 1 we hypothesize that multiple inputs may account for abnormally
low or high award confirmation rates. Both arbitration systems-the labor-
management and individual employment systems - include (1) the judge, (2)
the arbitrator, or (3) a particular feature of the arbitration system. In the following
discussion, we provide textual analysis of cases that fit into each of these
categories-for example, a court decision in which ajudge was too meddlesome,
or an arbitrator's decision or conduct that was so odd that the arbitrator must be
held responsible for vacatur of her award. We also discuss how systemic factors
contributed to court decisions that depart from the Trilogy norm.
200 A psychological explanation of this thought process is provided by Chris Guthrie et
al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 777, 805-06 (2001). A
"representativeness heuristic" occurs when "people make categorical judgments" that
"evidence being analyzed... is representative of the category." Id. at 805. Thus, when "the
evidence appears representative of, or similar to, the category ... peoplejudge the likelihood
that the evidence is a product of that category as high." Id. This may apply when judges
apply narrow review standards such as those imposed by the Trilogy and its progeny.
For example, Eastern instructs ajudge that if an "arbitrator is even arguably construing
or applying the contract and acting within the scope of his authority," the fact that "a court is
convinced he committed serious error does not suffice to overturn his decision." E.
Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers, Dist. 17, 531 U.S. 57, 62 (2000) (quoting
United Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960)). The judge
may equate this to a similar standard of review in a patent dispute in Dickinson v. Zurko, 527
U.S. 150 (1999). In that case, the Court dealt with judges who set aside findings of fact by
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. Id. Some judges applied the highly deferential
"clearly erroneous" standard, while others used less deferential standards under the
Administrative Procedure Act (allowing a court to set aside fact-findings that are arbitrary or
capricious, or result from abuse of discretion, or are unsupported by substantial evidence).
Although the Dickinson Court ruled in favor of the more permissive APA standards-and
thus, appeared to give federal courts more authority to overturn Patent Office than labor
arbitrator decisions-this example shows how judges could mistakenly categorize fact-
finding reviewing standards in the heuristic described by Guthrie et al.
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Chart 1
Sources of Deviation in Award Confirmation Rates
Actor or Institution
Labor-Management Cell 1 Cell 2 Cell 3
Arbitration Federal Arbitrator Arbitration
Judge System
Individual Employment Cell 4 Cell 5 Cell 6
Arbitration Federal Arbitrator Arbitration
Judge System
1. Cell I (Labor-Management Arbitration)-The Judge
Our database includes many cases that validate widely held concerns about
judicial review of awards. The district court decision in Tennessee Valley
Authority v. Tennessee Valley Trades & Labor Council20 1 is a case in point.
Robert Ingle, a nuclear power plant operator with seventeen years of
employment, was fired after he tested positive for marijuana.202 By company
policy he was referred to the Employee Assistance Program (EAP).203 Ingle
applied for admission, but during processing he received conflicting information
about his enrollment.20 4 One doctor approved him but another believed he had
no drug problem and therefore declined his admission.20 5 By the time this
confusion was cleared up, the company had deactivated Ingle's clearance and
fired him.20
6
The arbitrator, a former labor relations manager for Tennessee Valley
Authority (TVA), reinstated Ingle with backpay.207 He based his ruling on
positive assessments of Ingle made by his supervisors at the arbitration
201 Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Tenn. Valley Trades & Labor Council, 184 F.3d 510(6th Cir.
1999).
2 0 2 Id. at 512.
203 Id.
204 Id.
205 Id. at 512-13.




hearing.208 The arbitrator also noted that the EAP was designed for this kind of
occasion and the company put Ingle in an intolerable Catch-22 situation.
209
In suing to vacate the award, TVA contended that the arbitrator's decision
failed to draw its essence from the collective bargaining agreement (CBA).
210
Ruling in favor of TVA and vacating the award, the district court reasoned that
the CBA "must be 'read in the light of the relevant provisions of the Framework
Agreement,' which is 'key to understanding the nature of labor-management
relations governed by the [CBA]."'
211
The Sixth Circuit reversed and granted enforcement of the award,212 adding
this rebuke: "The district court's conclusion otherwise led it to substitute its own
notions of industrial fairness for that of the arbitrator. This result is problematic
because proper resolution of employee grievances is a subject matter in which
courts have little expertise."
213
2. Cell 2 (Labor-Management Arbitration)-The Arbitrator
The research literature rarely singles out arbitrators as part of the problem of
heightened judicial review. However, our database contains several highly
unusual arbitration awards.
Consider the embarrassing case of Flexsys America, L.P. v. Local Union No.
12610.214 A worker was suspended for thirty days after he argued with his
supervisor.215 At the end of a contentious hearing, the arbitrator asked some
questions and the attorneys agreed to leave the arbitration open for the
submission of a final brief.216 Later, the arbitrator called the company's attorney
and held an ex parte conversation. 217 Although briefs had not been submitted, he
announced to the attorney that he had already come to a decision on the,
merits.218 He said that he was not going to explain his reasons but asked the
208 Id.
209 Id. at 513-14.
210 Id. at 516.
211 Id. at 516-17 (citation omitted).
2 12 Id. at 520.
2 13 Id. at 516.
2 14 Flexsys Am., L.P. v. Local Union No. 12610, 88 F. Supp. 2d 600 (S.D. W. Va.
2000).
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attorney to reopen the arbitration to investigate the supervisor's background.219
He then stated that if the company declined to reopen the hearing to investigate
the supervisor, he would grant the grievance without explanation.
220
The arbitrator wanted to know if the supervisor was gay.221 While talking to
the company's attorney, the arbitrator said he handled hundreds of homosexual
cases in the military.222 He believed that the supervisor was "flighty" during the
hearing, and then said that if the grievant thought that his supervisor was "a
queer" he would rescind the discipline.223 After this extremely inappropriate
conversation ended, the employer's attorney contacted her union counterpart to
have the arbitrator removed from the case, but her request was declined. 224
The arbitrator then issued a ruling in which he upheld the grievance and
granted backpay.225 The company believed the award "failed to draw [its]
essence from the CBA," reflected the arbitrator's "own brand of industrial
justice," and was biased.226 The district court agreed, and vacated the award.
227
Considering the arbitrator's highly inappropriate post-hearing behavior, we
cannot fault the reasoning and decision of the district court.
Carpenter Local No. 1027 v. Lee Lumber & Building Material Corp.
228
provides another example of arbitrator misjudgment. After the company fired the
grievant, the union filed a grievance and negotiated his reinstatement. 229 The
only condition that the company put on reinstating the grievant was that he return









22 7 Id. at 604. The court stated,
There was never any evidence presented by either party that the supervisor was gay.
The only individual who raised homosexuality as an issue was the Arbitrator, and that
was after the arbitration hearing during an inappropriate, arbitrator-solicited, exparte
conversation. Accordingly, the Court finds that a reasonable person would conclude
that the Arbitrator was biased, and that arbitrator bias is also an appropriate ground for
vacation of the arbitration award.
Id.
228 Carpenter Local No. 1027 v. Lee Lumber & Bldg. Material Corp., 2 F.3d 796 (7th
Cir. 1993).




this time, and union officials did not track him down.231 However, the union
contacted him nine days after entering into this settlement and told him to report
to work.232 By then, the company withdrew its offer.233 The union then refiled
the grievance and prevailed at arbitration. 234 The arbitrator issued a strange
remedy, however. Although the CBA expressly defined a grievance as a
complaint or claim against the employer,235 he ordered the union to reimburse
the grievant for the entire amount of backpay.
236
The union sued in district court to vacate this remedy.237 The district court
ruled for the union, and reasoned that the arbitrator exceeded his contractual
authority.238 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed this vacatur.239 We cannot
fault the reasoning and conclusion of either court in this case.
At the same time, we also found cases of remarkable judicial restraint when
arbitrators used what the courts believed was extremely poor judgment. We
highlight two cases because they demonstrate potentially serious consequences
when courts adhere to the Trilogy's highly deferential review standards.
In Jacksonville Area Ass' for Retarded Citizens v. General Service
Employees Union, Local 73,240 a private-sector non-profit corporation provided
care for physically and mentally impaired residents. 241 One morning four









239 The Seventh Circuit stated,
Not only does the collective bargaining agreement strongly imply that the arbitrator
could not impose the reimbursement remedy he imposed in this case, we think it is
clearly implausible to suppose the parties ever contemplated that remedy. Given the
arbitration clause the parties did agree to, it is 'almost unimaginable' that the union
would have agreed to the type of remedy imposed here if the question had arisen during
bargaining.
Id. at 799 (quoting Miller Brewing Co. v. Brewery Workers Local No. 9, 739 F.2d 1159,
1164 (7th Cir. 1984)).
The court also reasoned "that Lee and the union did not agree to arbitrate any claims
other than those by the union or an employee against Lee." Id.
240 Jacksonville Area Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. Gen. Serv. Employees Union,
Local 73, 888 F. Supp. 901 (C.D. Iil. 1995).
241 Id. at 903.
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patient was a hermaphrodite. 242 Finding this resident in a classroom, they
removed him to the restroom to be toileted.243 Once there, one worker positioned
himself at the door while another lowered the client's pants in the presence of the
other two employees. 244 After satisfying their curiosity, the employees returned
the client to the classroom. 245 Once co-workers reported this incident, the
employer conducted a formal investigation and then fired these offenders.24
6
The arbitrator found that the employees' conduct was improper, but because
he believed termination was too severe, he reduced their punishment to an
unpaid suspension.247 The employer contended-and the reviewing court
agreed-that the workers abused this client.248 A variety of Illinois249 and
federal250 laws prohibit mistreatment of confined mental patients. The district
court believed that "one cannot persuasively argue against the existence of a
strong public policy prohibiting the abuse of mentally impaired individuals." 251








247 Id. at 904.
24 8 Id. at 906 ("In the instant matter, there does not appear to be a dispute concerning
the existence of a public policy supporting the prohibition and prevention of the abuse of
mentally impaired individuals. Indeed, there are several statutes that support this
conclusion.").
249 Id. at 906-07 (citing, inter alia, § 2-112 of the Illinois Mental Health and
Developmental Disabilities Code, 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-112 (West 1992) ("Every
recipient of services in a mental health or developmental disability facility shall be free from
abuse and neglect.. . ."); § 5-101 of the Illinois Mental Health and Developmental
Disabilities Code, 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1-101.1 (West 1992) (defining abuse as
"any physical injury, sexual abuse, or mental injuryinflicted on a recipient of services other
than by accidental means")).
2 50 Id. at 907 (citing the Protection and Advocacy for Mentally Ill Individuals Act of
1986,42 U.S.C. §§ 10801-10851 (1994) & Supp. IV 1998).
251 Id. at 907.
252 Id. at 908-09. "[T]he court.., is deeply disturbed and utterly revolted by the
employees' conduct underlying this action. We can confidently state that if we were
arbitrating the instant dispute, the employees would not have been reinstated to their former
positions." Id. at 909. The court continued, "However, that is not the issue here. The parties
contractually agreed to have an arbitrator interpret the disciplinary provisions of their
employment agreement and now the JAARC must live with that decision." Id.
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A bus company discharged a driver after he was involved in his twenty-
fourth accident during a twelve year career in United Transportation Union
Local 1589 v. Suburban Transit Corp.253 The last accident occurred on the New
Jersey Turnpike as the driver rear-ended a tractor trailer because he was
tailgating.254 In the past, nine of the driver's accidents were deemed to be
preventable. 255 This was his third preventable rear-end collision.
256
The arbitrator found that the driver was responsible for the accident.257 He
also determined that the driver was a "veteran employee who has given loyal
service to his company for some twelve years." 258 In addition, he concluded that
the company did not adequately train the driver.259 He reversed the discharge and
ordered the company to provide the driver more training.
260
The bus compahy sued to vacate the award, and the district court granted its
motion. 261 On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed the district court.262 Analyzing
whether the arbitrator exceeded his powers, the court said that "the parties
bargained for contractual ambiguity instead of defining 'proper cause' in the
CBA. Having decided not to define the phrase, Suburban cannot escape the
results of that bargain simply because the arbitrator has chosen to interpret that
phrase differently than Suburban may have wanted ... "263
Nevertheless, the appeals court conceded that the arbitrator's judgment was
faulty when the court acknowledged that "Suburban's interpretation of the CBA
is more reasonable than the result announced by the arbitrator." 264 In addition,
although the court recognized that the award posed a potential threat to public
safety, it found that the award did not violate an express public policy.265 In sum,






258 Id. at 380.




263 Id. at 380 (discussing News Am. Publ'ns, Inc. v. Newark Typographical Union,
Local 103, 918 F.2d 21, 24 (3d Cir. 1990)).
2641Id.
265 See id. at 382. "We acknowledge that public transportation safety is a valid public
concern, but Suburban has failed to demonstrate that public policy requires vacation of the
arbitrator's award here." Id.
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the Third Circuit's application of the Trilogy and Misco was legally correct, but
hindered the bus company's efforts to provide safe travel for its customers.
3. Cell 3 (Labor-Management Arbitration)-The Arbitration System
This cell addresses our finding for 1991-2001 that appellate courts
confirmed 73.2% of awards that were challenged on public policy grounds. As
we noted, this confirmation rate is similar to cases where an appeal was based on
some other issue. For example, the award fails to draw its essence from the
agreement. Thus, this issue does not warrant the concern that it has received
since Misco was decided.
Our database suggests that there is more to this story, however. When
appellate courts vacate awards on public policy grounds, the underlying dispute
usually involves the termination of an employee who was discharged for drugs or
alcohol. The new dimension appearing in our database is that courts still exercise
restraint in these cases but make an exception when the work setting poses a
strong safety concern to the public.
As evidence of this tendency, we highlight three vacatur decisions-all
involving separate events and locations-that consisted of Exxon Corporation
challenges to awards that reinstated employees who were discharged for drug or
alcohol violations. In Exxon Corp. v. Esso Workers Union,266 the company fired
a truck driver who hauled 12,000 gallons of gasoline on a public highway while
under the influence of cocaine. 267 The arbitrator upheld the validity of the drug
test but determined that the punishment was too severe, and therefore reduced
the penalty to a two month suspension.2 68 The First Circuit ruled that the
arbitrator's award violated "a broad national consensus that persons should not
be allowed to endanger others while laboring under the influence of drugs.
269
A 1989 accident involving a 635 foot oil tanker led to the discharge of the
ship's helmsman in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Exxon Seamen's Union.270 Morris
Foster was drug-tested after he ran his ship aground in the Mississippi River.
271
266 Exxon Corp. v. Esso Workers Union, 118 F.3d 841 (1st Cir. 1997), overruled in
part by E. Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 531 U.S. 57, 61 (2000).
267 Id. at 843-44.
268 Id.
269 Id. at 848. The court continued, "This consensus is made manifest by positive law
and translates into a well defined and dominant public policy-indeed, a national crusade-
counselling against the performance of safety-sensitive tasks by individuals who are so
impaired." Id.
270 Exxon Shipping Co. v. Exxon Seamen's Union, 993 F.2d 357 (3d Cir. 1993) (per
curiam).
271 Id. at 358.
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Exxon administered its own drug test and one for the U.S. Coast Guard. Foster
tested negative under the Coast Guard's more lenient standard, but positive for
marijuana under the company's tougher standard.272 After conducting a
confirmatory test and again finding traces of marijuana in Foster, Exxon fired
him.273 The arbitration board found that Exxon's more stringent standard was
not unreasonable and that the totality of the evidence conclusively established
Foster's use of marijuana.2 74 The arbitrators also concluded that Foster had been
on vacation nine days before the accident occurred, and his test showed residual
traces.275 This meant that the company failed to prove, under the CBA, that
Foster used marijuana while he was on duty.276 The arbitrator therefore decided
that the penalty was too severe and ordered the company to reinstate Foster.
277
In court, the union contended that Coast Guard drug regulations prohibit
drug use by seamen only while on duty.2 78 Exxon countered that the policy also
prohibits off-duty drug use.279 The appellate court disagreed with both parties
because their arguments "obscure[d] the goal of the public policy embodied in
the regulations-safe operation of vessels. 280 It vacated the award, noting that
"[i]n furtherance of this goal, the regulations require drug testing and authorize
the imposition of stiff penalties on employees like Foster who fail drug tests.
'"281
In Exxon Corp. v. Baton Rouge Oil & Chemical Workers,282 Donald Chube
temporarily substituted for a supervisor in a safety-sensitive position in a
chemical processing plant and therefore had to take a drug test.2 83 During this
time, the company revised its drug testing policy over the union's objections.2 84
The revision was more restrictive, because it included random testing and denied
rehabilitation for employees who tested positive.2 85 After the union and the
272 Id.
273 Id. at 358-59.




278 Id. at 361.
279 Id.
280 Id.
281 Id. The court continued, "The Coast Guard regulations are part of a broader public
policy against operation of common carriers under the influence of drugs or alcohol." Id. at
361. In support of this conclusion, the court cited an array of specific laws and regulations.
Id. at 361-62.
282 Exxon Corp. v. Baton Rouge Oil & Chem. Workers, 77 F.3d 850 (5th Cir. 1996).
283 Id. at 851.
284 Id. at 851-52.
2 85 See id. at 852.
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company negotiated to impasse, Exxon unilaterally implemented the revised
policy and said it would become effective on September 1, 1989.286
On August 24, Chube tested positive for cocaine use.287 Exxon fired him on
September 13, citing him for violating the newly implemented drug policy.
288
The arbitrator determined that the issue was whether Chube violated the policy,
not if Exxon had a right to terminate an employee who tested positive for
cocaine. 289 He then concluded that Exxon violated the CBA by discharging
Chube because the employee did not violate a posted rule.290 His award required
Exxon to reinstate Chube with full back pay.291 The arbitrator also provided an
alternative award of one year's backpay.292 He did this because Chube was
incarcerated after his discharge for selling drugs and therefore was unavailable
for reinstatement.
293
Exxon sued to vacate the award, but the district court denied this motion.2
94
On appeal before the Fifth Circuit, the company's motion to vacate was
granted. 295 Exxon contended that the award violated public policy because it
ordered reinstatement of a cocaine user and convicted drug dealer to a safety-
sensitive job.2 96 The union argued that the alternative award, ordering only
backpay and not reinstatement, violated no public policy.297 Finding this a close
case, the court vacated the award, reasoning that,
the public policy exception ... must be read not only to prohibit the
prospective placement of an employee into a position where he is a danger to
his company and to fellow employees... but also to prohibit a retrospective





290 Id. at 852-53.




295 Id. at 857.
296 Id. at 854.
297 Id.
298 Id. at 856. The court continued, "In addition to addressing future conduct, the public
policy against drug use in safety-sensitive positions also must look back to the conduct that
is the subject of the grievance. The policy looks to the future to ensure safety, but looks back
to deny condonation of misconduct." Id.
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In sum, we believe that the arbitration system is responsible for producing
some awards that conflict strongly with core judicial values. These conflicts are
so deeply rooted that they go beyond mere disagreement between individual
arbitrators and judges. To illustrate, in labor arbitration there is a powerful norm
to rehabilitate an errant employee. 299 Sometimes, however, courts conclude that
societal costs for enforcing this arbitral value are too high. In effect, courts are
forced to choose between the judicial values embedded in the Trilogy and other
judicial values, such as protecting the environment from an imminent
catastrophe. The Exxon cases reveal this conflict. Our point is that this problem
transcends individual judges and arbitrators and is systemic in nature.
Turning to the individual employment arena, we note how these arbitration
cases differ from the labor arbitration model. Award confirmation cases in this
arena are extremely rare but are rapidly increasing. This limited database
provides the following examples of cases that tended to deflect the confirmation
rate below or above the normal range.
4. Cell 4 (Individual Employment Arbitration)-The Judge
In all other cells in our matrix, we present decisions that vacated awards and
led to lower award confirmation rates. In the very limited time that federal courts
have been reviewing individual employment arbitration awards, no judge
299 Elkouri and Elkouri state,
Some consideration generally is given to the past record of any disciplined or
discharged employee. An offense may be mitigated by a good past record and it may be
aggravated by a poor one. Indeed, the employee's past record often is a major factor in
the determination of the proper penalty for his offense.
FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA ASPER ELKoURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 679 (4th ed. 1985).
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overturned an arbitrator's findings of fact or substituted judicial interpretation of
contract language for an arbitrator's judgment.
We note, however, that under the Trilogy and the FAA, some degree of
judicial review of arbitration awards is not only permitted, but is warranted.
When a judge is too deferential, this amounts to failure of judicial responsibility.
We pose the following decision as an example of what we believe is excessive
judicial deference to an award that resulted from an aberrant arbitration process.
In LaPrade v. Kidder, Peabody & Co.,300 Linda LaPrade sued Kidder
Peabody for sex discrimination. Her lawsuit was stayed on June 24, 1992,
pending the outcome of arbitration. 30 1 The first hearing occurred fourteen
months later, in September 1993. 302 The arbitration process extended over
seventy-four hearing and conference dates, and took six years to complete.303 On
October 8, 1999 the NASD Arbitration Panel issued its ruling denying all of
LaPrade's discrimination and defamation claims. 304 The panel also ordered
Kidder Peabody and LaPrade to pay, respectively, $61,424 and $8,376 for
NASD forum fees.3
05
Kidder Peabody returned to court to lift the stay and confirm the award.
30 6
LaPrade filed a counterclaim to vacate parts of the award, including her share of
forum fees.307 The court granted Kidder Peabody's motion in its entirety.
308
Noting that it had authority to review the award under the FAA309 as well as non-








3 08 Id. at 8.
309 Id. at 5 (citing the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1994)). Under the FAA,
federal courts are empowered to vacate an award
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; (2) where
there was evident partiality or corruption by the arbitrators; (3) where the arbitrators
were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause
shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of
any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or (4)
where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a
mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.
Id. (quoting 9 U.S.C. §10 (1994)).
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statutory common law standards, the court reviewed the award under the
common law standard of manifest disregard for the law.
310
LaPrade challenged the assessment of fees, basing her contentions on Cole v.
Burns International Security Services.311 That case differed from LaPrade's,
because the plaintiff challenged the arbitration process before an award was
issued.312 As the LaPrade court noted, Cole ruled that certain forum fees, those
that equate to filing fees and other administrative expenses in a federal lawsuit,
could be assessed in compulsory arbitration. 313 But the Cole court ruled that no
arbitration fees could be charged unless a court charged a similar fee.
314
In ruling that forum fees were not so excessive here as to constitute a manifest
disregard of the law, the LaPrade court was impressed by the fact that "[t]he
$8,376 in forum fees assessed against the complainant amount[ed] to $113.19 for
each of her seventy-four hearing sessions and conferences. '315 This ruling was
factually correct but missed the point made in Cole concerning the accessibility of
arbitration to employees who are compelled to substitute this forum for a court of
law. LaPrade incurred other costs in arbitrating her claims. Contrary to the
reputation that arbitration has for being a comparatively quick process, her six-
year hearing ordeal was no more advantageous-indeed, it was probably much
slower than most civil trials.
316
In addition, the LaPrade court's emphasis on cost per hearing ignored the cost
of her attorney fees for this protracted process. Although Cole analyzed types of
expenses that were chargeable to a complainant, the plaintiff in that case was not
charged over $8,000 for forum fees. The main point of Cole is that public courts
do not cost plaintiffs much in the way of direct charges; therefore, neither should
3 10 Id. at 5-6.
311 Id. at 6-7. LaPrade contended that "under the spirit and the letter of Cole, she
cannot be required to pay any part of the arbitration fees, much less $8,376." Id. at 7. In
making this argument, she quoted Cole: "[lt would undermine Congress' intent to prevent
employees who are seeking to vindicate statutory rights from gaining access to a judicial
forum and then require them to pay for the services of an arbitrator when they would never
be required to pay for ajudge in court." Id. at 7 (quoting Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105
F.3d 1465, 1484 (D.C. Cir. 1997)).
312 Cole, 105 F.3d at 1469-70.
3 13 LaPrade, 94 F. Supp 2d at 7 (citing Cole, 105 F.3d at 1484).
3 14 
Id.
3 15 Id. at 7 n.6.
316 See id. at4 (reporting that LaPrade's employment discrimination lawsuit was stayed
by court order on June 24, 1992, hearings commenced in September 1993, and the
arbitration panel ruled on her complaint on October 8, 1999). Compare to a typical civil trial
as discussed in Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Sys., Inc., 238 F.3d 549, 552 (4th Cir.
2001).
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an arbitration. 317 By deferring to an award that was so expensive in direct and
indirect costs to a complainant, the judge in LaPrade legitimized the use of high
process costs as a method of reducing employee access to arbitration.
318
5. Cell 5 (Individual Employment Arbitration)-The Arbitrator
The district court in DeGaetano v. Smith Barney, Inc.319 vacated part of an
award that denied a complainant's motion for attorney fees in a sex
discrimination case. In March 1995, DeGaetano sued Smith Barney, alleging that
her complaints of sexual harassment by her boss were ignored.320 In February
1996, a federal court denied DeGaetano access to a judicial forum, and
compelled arbitration of her claims for sex discrimination and emotional
distress. 3
21
During an early phase of the arbitration, DeGaetano formally applied for
recovery of her attorney fees. 322 On March 18, 1997, the arbitration panel
awarded DeGaetano $90,355 in damages and interest-equal to one year of pay
-but denied her petition for attorney fees.323 While this amount was not
reported, it was probably substantial because the hearing phase of her arbitration
took ten days.3
24
DeGaetano sued to vacate the fee portion of her award.325 She based her
challenge on Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, as amended, providing that
"the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party... a reasonable
317 See Cole, 105 F.3d at 1484. After determining that the issue at hand was whether
an employer can require an employee to arbitrate disputes and pay for the arbitration fees,
the Cole court proclaimed:
There is no doubt that parties appearing in federal court may be required to assume the
cost of filing fees and other administrative expenses, so any reasonable costs of this sort
that accompany arbitration are not problematic. However, if an employee like Cole is
required to pay arbitrators' fees ranging from $500 to S 1,000 per day or more.., in
addition to administrative and attorney's fees, is it likely that he will be able to pursue
his statutory claims? We think not.
Id.
318 See LaPrade, 94 F. Supp. 2d at 8. Further LaPrade's appeal was denied in LaPrade
v. Kiddler, Peabody & Co., 246 F.3d 702 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
319 DeGaetano v. Smith Barney, Inc., 983 F. Supp. 459 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
320 Id. at 460.
321 Id.






attorney's fee."326 The district court adopted the common law standard that
permits vacatur or modification in the rare instance "when the arbitrator[ ] acted
in manifest disregard of the law."
327
In ruling for DeGaetano, the court observed that although not couched in
mandatory terms, this statute establishes a presumptive entitlement to an award
of attorney's fees for prevailing parties.328 Concluding that DeGaetano's award
must have been based on a finding of employment discrimination, the court
reasoned that she was a prevailing plaintiff under Title VII and therefore entitled
to recover attorney fees.329 Finally, the court found that this legal oversight was
not inadvertent. It said that "the Arbitration Panel appreciated the existence of a
clearly governing legal principle but decided to ignore or pay no attention to
it."330
In Montes v. Shearson Lehman Bros., 33 1 the Eleventh Circuit found that an
arbitration award manifestly disregarded a federal wage and hour law. The Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA) requires employers to keep track of an employee's
time at work and pay overtime after forty hours per week, unless that employee
falls under an appropriate managerial or related exemption. Delfina Montes was
an office worker in Shearson's Hallandale branch office, and sued her employer
326 Id. at 461 n.3 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1994)).
327 Id. at 462 (quoting Willemijn Houdstermaatschappij, BV v. Standard
Microsystems Corp., 103 F.3d 9, 12 (2d Cir. 1997)). The court explained that it "should not
vacate an arbitration award for manifest disregard simply because of 'error or
misunderstanding with respect to the law."' Id. (quoting Int'l Telepassport Corp. v. USFI,
Inc., 89 F.3d 82, 85 (2d Cir. 1996)). Instead, "the term manifest disregard clearly means
more: 'The error must have been obvious and capable of being readily and instantly
perceived by the average person qualified to serve as an arbitrator.' Moreover, the term
disregard implies that the arbitrator appreciates the existence of a clearly governing legal
principle but decides to ignore or pay no attention to it." Id. (quoting DiRussa v. Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc., 121 F.3d 818, 821 (2d Cir. 1997) (emphasis added)).
328 Id. (citing, inter alia, Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424,429 (1983) (stating "that
in order to 'ensure effective access to the judicial process for persons with civil rights
grievances ... a prevailing plaintiff should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless
special circumstances would render such an award unjust')).
329 Id.
330 Id. at 464 (citing DiRossa v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 121 F.3d 818, 821 (2d
Cir. 1997)). The employer also contended that an award of attorney's fees was barred here
in any event by the Smith Barney Arbitration Policy. DeGaetano's employment agreement
stated that "[e]ach side shall pay its own legal fees and expenses." Id. at 460. She
maintained, however, that this contract provision was void as a matter ofpublic policy. The
court rejected Smith Bamey's contention by holding that the arbitration policy conflicted
with public policy by denying prevailing plaintiffs an award of attorney's fees in
employment discrimination cases. Id. at 464-65.
331 Montes v. Shearson Lehman Bros., 128 F.3d 1456 (1 lth Cir. 1997).
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for failure to pay overtime.332 Because she signed an industry arbitration
agreement, her suit was dismissed and her only recourse was to arbitrate her
FLSA claim.33
3
At the hearing, counsel for Shearson told the arbitration panel to ignore the
FLSA. 334 The award sustained Shearson's position and failed to analyze Montes'
FLSA claim. 335 She sued to vacate the award, and the district court dismissed her
challenge. 336 On appeal, she challenged the arbitration panel's decision as
arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to public policy.337 Her appeal relied heavily
on the transcript showing that Shearson's lawyer repeatedly told the panel to
disregard the FLSA.338
The Eleventh Circuit reviewed the award under the FAA and common law
standards. 339 Noting that it had jurisdiction under the FAA, the court used these
non-statutory standards to review Montes' appeal: Was the arbitration decision
(1) arbitrary or capricious, (2) in manifest disregard of the law, and (3) violative
of public policy?340 Recognizing that "each of these three grounds could
conceivably be encompassed in the other, courts, including this one, have treated
332 Id. at 1458.
333 Id.
334 Id. at 1459. For example, the attorney said on the record, "I know, as I have served
many times as an arbitrator, that you as an arbitrator are not guided strictly to follow case
law precedent. That you can also do what's fair and just and equitable and that is what
Shearson is asking you to do in this case." Id. Then, during closing arguments, he said,
You have to decide whether you're going to follow the statutes that have been
presented to you, or whether you will do or want to do or should do what is right and
just and equitable in this case. I know it's hard to have to say this and it's probably
even harder to hear it but in this case this law is not right. Know that there is a
difference between law and equity and I think, in my opinion, that difference is
crystallized in this case. The law says one thing. What equity demands and requires and
is saying is another. What is right and fair and proper in this? You know as arbitrators
you have the ability, you're not strictly bound by case law and precedent. You have the
ability to do what is right, what is fair and what is proper, and that's what Shearson is
asking you to do.
Id.
335 Id. at 1458.
336 Id.
337 Id.
338 Id. at 1459.




these reasons as discrete and separate."341 It then narrowed its review to
"manifest disregard of the law."
342
This analysis began by defining the extremely limited role that federal courts
play in conducting this review. 34 3 An award cannot be reversed for error or
misinterpretation. 344 However, as other circuits have found,345 clear disregard for
the law is another matter:
When a claim arises under specific laws, however, the arbitrators are bound to
follow those laws in the absence of a valid and legal agreement not to do so. As
the Supreme Court has stated, 'by agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a
party does not forego the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only
submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.' 346
The Eleventh Circuit then differentiated between an award that involves an
erroneous interpretation of the law, and one that involves manifest disregard:
'"Manifest"' means '[e]vident to the senses, especially to the sight, obvious to
the understanding, evident to the mind, not obscure or hidden, and is
synonymous with open, clear, visible, unmistakable, undubitable, indisputable,
evident, and self-evident. 7 347 "Disregard," according to the court, means "to





3 45 Id. (noting that most other circuits expressly recognized that manifest disregard of
the law is an appropriate reason to review and vacate an award) (citing Barnes v. Logan,
122 F.3d 820 (9th Cir. 1997); Willemijn Houdstermaatschappij, BV v. Standard
Microsystems Corp., 103 F.3d 9 (2d Cir. 1997); M & C Corp. v. Erwin Behr GmbH & Co.,
KG, 87 F.3d 844 (6th Cir.1996); Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc. v. Tanner, 72 F.3d 234 (1st
Cir. 1995); United Transp. Union Local 1589 v. Suburban Transit Corp., 51 F.3d 376 (3d
Cir. 1995); Nat'l Wrecking Co. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 731, 990 F.2d 957 (7th
Cir. 1993); Lee v. Chica, 983 F.2d 883 (8th Cir. 1993); Upshur Coals Corp. v. United Mine
Workers of Am., Dist. 31, 933 F.2d 225 (4th Cir. 1991); Jenkins v. Prudential-Bache Sec.,
Inc., 847 F.2d 631 (10th Cir. 1988)). But see Mcllroy v. PaineWebber, Inc., 989 F.2d 817,
820 n. 2 (5th Cir. 1993) (rejecting non-statutory grounds for vacating arbitration awards).
346 Montes, 128 F.3d at 1459-60 (quoting Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane, Corp.,
500 U.S. 20 (1991)). "[W]e have indicated that there is no reason to assume at the outset
that arbitrators will not follow the law; although judicial scrutiny of arbitration awards
necessarily is limited, such review is sufficient to ensure that arbitrators comply with the
requirements of the statute." Montes, 128 F.3d at 1460 (quoting Shearson/American Exp.,
Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220,232 (1987)).
347 Id. at 1461 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 962 (6th ed. 1990)).
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consideration; to ignore; to overlook; to fail to observe. '348 After considering
these definitions, the court concluded "that a manifest disregard for the law, in
contrast to a misinterpretation, misstatement or misapplication of the law, can
constitute grounds to vacate an arbitration decision."
349
Applying this standard, the court vacated the award, noting that "we are able
to clearly discern from the record that this is one of those cases where manifest
disregard of the law is applicable, as the arbitrators recognized that they were
told to disregard the law (which the record reflects they knew) in a case in which
the evidence to support the award was marginal. '350 The appeals court remanded
the matter to the district court with instructions to refer the dispute to a new
arbitration panel.35
1
Neary v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America was another manifest
disregard case.352 In vacating the award, the district court appeared to re-arbitrate
the underlying employment dispute. We call attention to this case because, unlike
Montes, the arbitrator was not told to disregard the law. Instead, the court
concluded that the arbitrator did this on his own initiative. This decision shows
that a reviewing court can exercise considerable discretion under the manifest
disregard standard.
Thomas Neary alleged wrongful termination in his suit against Prudential
Insurance, but the court denied Neary a trial and granted the employer's motion
to compel arbitration. 353 More than a year and a half later, a panel of NASD
arbitrators granted summary judgment in favor of Prudential.354 On a motion to
vacate, the district court ruled in favor of Neary. 355 The judge concluded that the
factual record showed that the arbitration panel's decision to grant summary
judgment in favor of Prudential was in manifest disregard of the law. 356 The
panel failed to account for state law exceptions to employment at will. 357 These
348 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 472 (6th ed. 1990).
349 Montes, 128 F.3d at 1461-62 ("We emphasize again that this ground is a narrow
one.").
350 Id. at 1462.
351 Id. at 1464.
352 Neary v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 63 F. Supp. 2d 208 (D. Conn. 1999).
353 Id. at 208.
354 Id.
355 Id. at 209.
356 Id.
357 Id. at 209-10. The court noted that Neary predicated his wrongful termination
claim on CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-51(q) (1997) and Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc.,
427 A.2d 385 (Conn. 1980).
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limit an employer's right to fire an employee when that person exercises a First
Amendment right or the employee's conduct is protected by a public policy.3
58
Neary brought these legal standards to the attention of the arbitration
panel.359 The court then concluded, "It is unquestionable that the arbitration
panel manifestly disregarded the standard for summary judgment. The record in
this case provides overwhelming evidence to support an inference that Neary was
wrongfully terminated. '360 The court based its decision on an inference rather
than direct evidence. In a passage that suggests future grounds for expanding
judicial review of awards, the court said, "The record in this case strongly
indicates that the arbitration panel did not base its ruling in favor of Prudential
on motion to dismiss grounds. The failure of the panel to explain its decision
complicates this determination."
361
6. Cell 6 (Individual Employment Arbitration)-The Arbitration
System
This Section presents another case that used the non-statutory standard of
manifest disregard of the law. We classify Halligan v. Piper Jafifray, Inc.362 in
Cell 6, because the action that constituted manifest disregard of the law-an
award that failed to explain the reason for denying a complaint-is not an
idiosyncratic problem, but rather, is a systemic practice in this arbitration
domain.
The plaintiff sued to vacate an NASD award as executrix for her husband's
estate. 363 Theodore Halligan, her husband, unsuccessfully arbitrated his claim of
age discrimination under the ADEA.364 The district court dismissed a challenge
358 Id. at 210.
359 Id. ("Neary clearly identified for the arbitration panel the proper and relevant legal
standard for summary judgment.").
360 Id. (noting that Prudential documents referred to Neary as a "union instigator" and
that Prudential knew that Neary was associated with a terminated Prudential agent named
Plante who was involved in whistle-blowing activities). "Prudential deposed Neary as part
of its defense against a suit by Plante and then terminated Neary about one month later
allegedly based on information Neary provided during that deposition." Id. The court
concluded, "These facts undeniably raise a genuine issue of material fact in regard to
Prudential's motivation for terminating Neary. On a motion for summaryjudgment, that is
all the law requires." Id.
361 Id. at 211 n.3 (emphasis added).
362 Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 1998).
363 Id. at 198.
364 Id.
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to this award.365 On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed this judgment and
vacated the award.
366
When he was hired in 1973 as a salesman, Halligan signed an industry
arbitration agreement. 367 In 1992, Halligan claimed that he was forced out of his
job by a new CEO who discriminated against him because of age.368 Halligan's
claim was first presented at an arbitration hearing in October 1993, and hearings
continued into 1995.369 By then, Halligan's cancer prevented him from
testifying.370 After Halligan died, his widow continued the arbitration, and
during these hearings, arbitrators were presented with "very strong evidence of
age-based discrimination." 371 For example, just before his separation, Halligan
ranked fifth among twenty-five salesmen.372 His employer's main defense was
that Halligan voluntarily retired. In March 1996, after extensive hearings, the
arbitrators denied all claims made by the Halligans. The award recited the claims
and defenses of each party, but contained no explanation or rationale.
In reviewing the award for manifest disregard of the law, the court observed
that "the reach of the doctrine is severely limited. 373 Halligan contended that
"the NASD has undue influence here." 374 The court declined to rule on this
complaint but narrowed its attention to the common practice in individual







371 Id. The Second Circuit recited this evidence at length (noting that although
Halligan ranked first in the firm in sales from 1987 through 1991, and had always been
among Piper's top salesmen, he was subjected to repeated discriminatory statements by
upper-level management, such as "you're too old... [and] our clients are young and they
want young salesmen," and "we want you out of here quickly.") Id. at 198-99.
372 Id. at 198.
373 Id. at 202 (quoting Government of India v. Cargill, Inc., 867 F.2d 130, 133 (2d Cir.
1989)). In the Second Circuit, manifest disregard "clearly means more than error or
misunderstanding with respect to the law." Id. The court stated that in order to modify or
vacate an award for manifest disregard, it "must find both that (1) the arbitrators knew of a
governing legal principle yet refused to apply it or ignored it altogether, and (2) the law
ignored by the arbitrators was well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable to the case." Id.
(citing DiRussa v. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc., 121 F.3d 818, 821 (2d Cir. 1997)).
374 Id. Halligan criticized the industry's exclusive control over NASD's Code of




Applying the manifest disregard standard to this facet, the court remarked
that "Halligan presented overwhelming evidence that Piper's conduct... was
motivated by age discrimination." 375 The Second Circuit reasoned: "In view of
the strong evidence that Halligan was fired because of his age and the agreement
of the parties that the arbitrators were correctly advised of the applicable legal
principles, we are inclined to hold that they ignored the law or the evidence or
both."376 The court added, "Moreover, the arbitrators did not explain their
award." 37
7
In reaching this result, the court declined to state a broad rule that requires
arbitrators to explain their awards.378 Instead, it offered this guidance:
We want to make clear that we are not holding that arbitrators should write
opinions in every case or even in most cases. We merely observe that where a
reviewing court is inclined to find that arbitrators manifestly disregarded the
law or the evidence and that an explanation, if given, would have strained
credulity, the absence of explanation may reinforce the reviewing court's
confidence that the arbitrators engaged in manifest disregard.
379
The Second Circuit also based its reasoning on assumptions made by the
Supreme Court in Gihner.380 After stating that "[t]his case puts those
assumptions to the test, '381 the court concluded that "[h]ad the arbitrators offered
375 Id. at 203.
376 Id. at 204.
377 Id.
378 Id. ("It is true that we have stated repeatedly that arbitrators have no obligation to
do so."). In this vein, it is interesting to consider Justice Douglas' thoughts on this a
generation ago in the Trilogy: "To require opinions free of ambiguity may lead arbitrators
to play it safe by writing no supporting opinions. This would be undesirable for a well-
reasoned opinion tends to engender confidence in the integrity of the process and aids in
clarifying the underlying agreement." United Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp.,
363 U.S. 593, 598 (1960) (citation omitted).
379 Halligan, 148 F.3d at 204.
380 Id. The Halligan court recalled,
[T]he Supreme Court ruled that an employee could be forced to assert an ADEA claim
in an arbitral forum, [but] the Court did so on the assumptions that the claimant would
not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute, that the arbitration agreement
simply changed the forum for enforcement of those rights and that a claimant could
effectively vindicate his or her statutory rights in the arbitration.
Id. (quoting Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991)).
381 Observing that Gilmer stated that procedural inadequacies in arbitration are best left
for resolution in specific cases, the Second Circuit noted, "At least in the circumstances here,
we believe that when a reviewing court is inclined to hold that an arbitration panel
manifestly disregarded the law, the failure of the arbitrators to explain the award can be
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[an] explanation of the award, on this record it would have been extremely hard
to accept-but they did not do even that. 382
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The Supreme Court's 2000-2001 term showed a continuing emphasis on
promoting workplace arbitration. In three pertinent decisions, the Court
strengthened the autonomy of these private ADR systems. Eastern provided the
federal courts a reinforcing signal to avoid vacating labor arbitration awards that
appear to conflict with a public policy. Unless an award directly conflicts with a
positive law, for example, by reinstating an employee when a statute or other
positive law expressly forbids employment of a person who breaks a rule or law,
courts are to confirm an arbitrator's decision. 383 Garvey bolstered the Trilogy
message that "courts... have no business weighing the merits of the grievance
[or] considering whether there is equity in a particular claim.' "384 Circuit City
instructed federal courts to enforce employment arbitration agreements in the
private and mostly nonunion segment of the workforce.
Our empirical research captures the most detailed images of these evolving
ADR systems. These pictures lead us to the following conclusions.
A. The Labor-Management Model
Our overriding conclusion is that most critics of the judicial review of labor
arbitration awards fail to give federal courts due credit for their continuing
adherence to the Trilogy.
1. Considering all types of challenges to labor arbitration awards, the results
here show that courts behave consistently. The confirmation rates by district and
appellate courts respectively from 1960-1991 were 71.8% and 70.5%.385 The
overall confirmation rates observed here are almost the same.386 These figures
tell the most important story about judicial review of labor arbitration awards:
federal district courts have consistently enforced awards since the Trilogy.
taken into account." Id. at 204. The court stated, "[W]e are left with the firm belief that the
arbitrators here manifestly disregarded the law or the evidence or both." Id.
3 8 2 Id.
383 E. Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers, Dist. 17,531 U.S. 57,63 (2000).
384 Major League Baseball Players Ass'n v. Garvey, 121 S. Ct. 1724,1728
(2001) (quoting United Paperworks Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 37 (1987)).




2. For public policy challenges to awards, there is too much emphasis on a
few precedents that arguably depart from the Trilogy. The 72% award
confirmation rate by district courts from 1991-2001 in public policy cases is a
significant improvement compared to previously published results for earlier
periods (54.7% confirmation rate in 1960-1981, and 55.3% in 1982-1987).
387
The confirmation rate found for the brief period following Misco (69.5% for
1988-1991) remained nearly constant in this study.388 The fact that appellate
courts from 1991-2001 confirmed awards at nearly the same rate as district
courts (73.2%)389 adds to the evidence of impressive consistency by the courts.
Nevertheless, our analysis of three Exxon Corporation decisions390 suggests why
the Supreme Court issued another cautionary decision in Eastern. After the
Exxon Valdez disaster, caused by a drunken helmsman, courts have been tom
between unusually difficult choices: adhere very closely to the guidance and
spirit of Misco, or give practical effect to a variety of laws that aim to protect co-
workers, communities, and the environment from extraordinary safety risks.
3. This study empirically validates the claim that some courts fail to adhere
to the deferential standards of the Trilogy, but pinpoints the problem in the
South. The Fourth and Eleventh Circuits have abnormally low confirmation rates
and appear to act upon unarticulated regional norms. In the Eleventh Circuit, for
example, eleven out of eleven appealed awards favored unions, but only 28%
ultimately survived review by both the district and appellate courts. 391 District
courts in the Sixth and Eighth Circuits, some of which are in the South, had
similar confirmation rates. In the Fifth Circuit, district courts had confirmation
rates in the appropriate range, but the appellate court had an abnormally low rate.
In sum, a comparison of circuits that are completely or partly in the South
with all others shows a distinct regional pattern, with courts in the former
confirming awards below the acceptable range.392 They also distorted the
national award confirmation rate. Removing these five Southern Circuits (the
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Eleventh), in which district courts confirmed
sixty-three awards in one hundred twelve cases for an enforcement rate of 56%,
district courts in the rest of the nation confirmed one hundred awards in one
387 LeRoy & Feuille, supra note 155, at 106 tbl.6. In this earlier study we examined
outcomes for 1982-1987 to determine if President Reagan's appointments to the bench
altered the award confirmation rate, but found no effect. Cf. Orley Ashenfelter et al.,
Politics and the Judiciary: The Influence ofJudicial Background on Case Outcomes, 24 J.
LEGAL STUD. 257 (1995).
388 LeRoy & Feuille, supra note 155, at 106.
389 See supra Section IV, at p. 52 tbl.2.
390 See supra notes 257-89.
391 See supra Section IV, at p. 50 tbl.1.
392 Id.
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hundred twenty cases for an enforcement rate of 83%. The same comparison at
the appellate level shows that Southern Circuits confirmed forty-three awards in
seventy-three cases for an enforcement rate of 59%, while courts in the rest of the
nation confirmed thirty-four awards in forty-three cases for an enforcement rate
of 79%.
This distinct regional difference compounds a geographic bias against
unions-the right-to-work amendment-that Congress embedded in the Taft-
Hartley Act.3 93 The same 1947 legislation that led to judicial oversight of
collective bargaining agreements also stimulated Southern states to enact or
amend right-to-work laws. 394 This legislation, which outlawed compulsory union
dues,395 combined with this region's apparent aversion to labor unions and its
lower labor costs to promote employer relocation of operations to the South.
3 96
393 See Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947, ch. 120, § 14(b), 61 Stat 136, 151
(1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1994)) ("Nothing in this subchapter shall be
construed as authorizing the execution or application of agreements requiring membership
in a labor organization as a condition of employment in any State or Territory in which such
execution or application is prohibited by State or Territorial law."). On the surface,
Republicans defended this amendment on grounds of states rights. See H.R. CONF. REP.
No. 510, on H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 15, reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947 (1959), at 564 (intent of legislation is only
to effectuate existing state laws that prohibit compulsory union membership). A more
realistic picture than the official one in the Conference Report appears in HARRY A. MIis
& EMILY CLARK BROWN, FROM THE WAGNER AT TO TAFT-HARTLEY 326-29 (1950). They
observed that the "major part of this legislation in 1947 still came from the South and
Southwest... ." Id. at 329.
394 As of 1995, twenty-one states enacted right-to-work laws (Alabama, Arizona,
Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Nebraska,
Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas,
Utah, Virginia, and Wyoming). Right-to-Work Laws: Efforts to Enact Right-to-Work Laws
Heat Up in 1995 State Legislatures, 52 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) C-2 (Mar. 17, 1995). For a
study on the impact of this legislation, see Gasper A. Garofalo & Devinder A. Malhotra, An
Integrated Model ofthe Economic Effects ofRight-to-Work Laws, 13 J. LAB. RES. 293,299
(1992) (concluding right-to-work laws reduced unionization rates by one-third).
395 An insightful study explains,
Right-to-work laws strike at unions' main resource, dues. If all workers within a
bargaining unit always sought membership and willingly paid their dues, right-to-work
laws could have little significance for collective bargaining. American workers have not
been noted, however, for their whole-hearted devotion to, and voluntary support of,
unions.
James W. Kuhn, Right-to-Work Laws-Symbols or Substance? 14 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV.
587, 588 (1961).
396 See Charles B. Craver, The Impact ofFinancial Crises Upon Collective Bargaining
Relationships, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 465, 482 (1988) ("Because of both historical
antiunion sentiment and the prevalence of state 'right-to-work' statutes - which prohibit
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Our findings imply that judicial review of arbitration awards adds to union-
avoidance benefits for employers in the South. These results also suggest that it
is not coincidental that much of the Supreme Court's labor arbitration
jurisprudence originated in Southern federal courts (Tennessee,397 West
Virginia,398 Alabama, 399 Mississippi,40 . Louisiana, 40 1 and again, West
Virginia).4 02
4. In contrast to the arbitration-award literature, we are able to compare
vacatur and confirmation decisions to similar forms of judicial behavior. Our
findings of award confirmation rates for the current and earlier periods of
analysis altogether, fluctuating narrowly from the upper-sixty to lower-seventy
the negotiation of union security arrangements- the labor movement will probably find it
arduous to organize workers in the south and southwest regions of the country.") (footnote
omitted); THOMAS A. KOcHAN ET AL., THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS 70 (1994) ("One of the best guarantees for keeping a plant unorganized was to
locate it in a southern state.").
397 The arbitrability case in the Trilogy was first heard by the District Court of Eastern
Tennessee, where that court ruled that the union's grievance was not arbitrable. United
Steelworkers v. Am. Mfg. Co., 264 F.2d 624 (6th Cir. 1959) rev'd, 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
398 The discipline case in the Trilogy was heard by the District Court of West Virginia,
which confirmed an arbitrator's award that reinstated discharged employees. Enterprise
Wheel & Car Corp. v. United Steelworkers, 168 F. Supp. 308 (D.C .W. Va. 1958). The
Fourth Circuit reversed this ruling and effectively vacated the award in Enterprise Wheel &
Car Corp. v. United Steelworkers, 269 F.2d 327 (4th Cir. 1959).
399 The contract interpretation case in the Trilogy was heard by the Southern District
Court of Alabama, which ruled that the employer had a right to subcontract work under the
management rights part of the labor agreement. United Steelworkers ofAmerica v. Warrior
& Gulf Navigation Co., 168 F. Supp. 702 (S.D. Ala. 1958). The Fifth Circuit affirmed this
vacatur ruling in United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 269 F.2d 633 (5th
Cir. 1959), rev'd, 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
400 The Supreme Court's first public policy labor arbitration case was initially decided
by the Northern District Court of Mississippi in an unreported case. See W. R. Grace & Co.
v. Local Union No. 759, Int'l Union of United Rubber Workers, 652 F.2d 1248 (5th Cir.
1981). The district court set aside the award and granted relief to the employer, but this
ruling was reversed by the Fifth Circuit.
401 The Supreme Court's second public policy labor arbitration case was initially
decided by the Western District Court of Louisiana. See United Paperworkers Int'l Union v.
Misco, Inc., 768 F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1985). The district court denied enforcement of the
award, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed this vacatur.
402 Te Supreme Court's third and most recent public policy labor arbitration case
departs from the regional pattern ofjudicial interference with awards. The Southern District
Court of West Virginia confirmed the award in Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. United
Mine Workers, District 17, 66 F. Supp. 2d 796 (S.D. W. Va. 1998), and its ruling was
affirmed by the Fourth Circuit in Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers,
District 17, 188 F.3d 501 (4th Cir. 1999).
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percent range, is consistent with federal court behavior in reviewing NLRB order
and patent verdicts.403 This comparison improves on current arbitration research,
not only because it is based on data rather than conjecture, but also because it
shows that when judges review rulings of presumed subject matter experts, they
face the paradox of deferring to this expertise while insuring that specialized
tribunals act within the bounds of external laws. We conclude that the
conventional wisdom exaggerates court interference with labor arbitration
awards. This view not only lacks statistical evidence, but overstates the problem
of judicial review as an institutional attack on the primacy of arbitrator
jurisdiction.
404
We also caution that our empirical findings do not mean that federal courts
would confirm about 70% of the entire universe of arbitration awards. That
would falsely assume that any time an employer or union loses an arbitration
award, they appeal the outcome.40 5 As Karl Llewellyn once remarked, litigated
cases bear the same relationship to the underlying pool of disputes "as does
homicidal mania or sleeping sickness to our normal life."'40 6 In short, award
appeals are rare cases precisely because most parties abide by the promise to
accept the arbitrator's award as final and binding. If these extraordinary appeals
contain a disproportionate share of flawed rulings by arbitrators, then it follows
that our empirical measures reflect a high degree of court deference to labor
arbitration.
B. The Individual Employment Model
Although the individual employment arbitration system substantially differs
from the labor-management model, our main conclusion has a similar theme.
Although courts substantially defer to arbitrator rulings, more judges are
stringently reviewing awards in these arbitrations. In time, we believe they will
behave more like courts in the labor-management domain. More specifically, our
research leads to these conclusions:
1. Certainly, the confirmation rates for the individual employment cases are
higher than labor-management cases (compare 70.3% and 66.4% respectively for
403 See supra notes 178-82.
404 See supra notes 147-48.
405 For a general discussion of expectancy theory suggesting that trials do not reflect
the universe of all disputes, see Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Models and Trial Outcomes
in Civil Rights and Prisoner Cases, 77 GEO. L.J. 1567, 1568 (1989).
406 KARL LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 58 (2d ed.
1951).
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district and circuit courts reviewing labor arbitration awards,407 and 85.3% and
81.3% for the district and circuit courts that reviewed individual employment
awards). 40 8 But our research shows that the confirmation rate has begun to drop
for the individual cases. These data are preliminary and subject to the usual
caveats about small sample size and missing information, but consider that from
1991 to 1996 district courts decided only six award-challenge cases and
confirmed the award each time. However, during 1997-2000 (we found no
reported district decisions as of March 31, 2001), these courts confirmed awards
in fourteen out of seventeen cases (82.4%).409 In sum, we suggest that the
similarities in confirmation rates across these two systems are noteworthy. This is
especially so if the comparison eliminates district courts from circuits that are
totally or partly located in the South (compare 85% confirmation rate for
individual employment cases, and 83% for labor-management awards).
410
2. If judicial review of individual employment awards were limited to
standards expressly enumerated in the FAA,411 this function would be reasonably
straight-forward. However, this review is more complicated, and at the same time
less anchored in a coherent body of law, than labor cases. Often, courts consider
a large complex of statutory standards under the FAA and also non-statutory
standards.412 There is no detectable rhyme or reason in a court's choice of one
set of standards over others. Furthermore, courts concede that standards such as
manifest disregard of the law are poorly defined.4 13 Finally, since the FAA
applies to a wide variety of dispute settings, many of which have nothing to do
with the special characteristics of the employment relationship, 4 14 the review of
407 See supra Section IV, at p. 52 tbl.2.
408 See supra Section IV, at pp. 54-56 tbl.3.
409 Unfortunately, we were not able to determine the year of the district court ruling in
the remaining eleven cases decided at this level (these cases were reported only as circuit
court decisions, and the appellate court's opinion did not provide enough information to
determine the date of the district court decision).
4 10 See Section VI.A., Point 3.
411 See LaPrade v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 94 F. Supp. 2d 2, 5 (2000).
4 12 See Brown v. ITT Consumer Fin. Corp., 211 F.3d 1217 (1 th Cir. 2000). Plaintiff's
challenge of award claimed (1) that the arbitration clause failed because it was vague, (2)
that the arbitration clause was so broad as to exceed § 2 of the FAA, (3) that any agreement
to arbitrate was voided because the specified procedure no longer existed, (4) the Company
waived its right to arbitration by its reorganization of the company and its failure to raise
the arbitrability of the claims with the EEOC, and (5) that the award was arbitrary and
capricious and evidenced a manifest disregard for the law. Id. at 1221-23.
413 E.g., LaPrade, 94 F.Supp 2d at 5 ("[C]ontours of the manifest disregard standard
are nebulous.").
414 E.g., LaPrade, 94 F. Supp. 2d at 8; Sobol v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 49 F. Supp.
2d 208,223 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (in judging whether arbitrator misconduct warranted vacatur
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individual employment claims appears to suffer from this lumping effect. In
particular, we note the contrast between these types of review and those
conducted in the Trilogy, where the Supreme Court demonstrated particular
sensitivity for the common law of the shop-an industrial code that defines
expectations and norms for employers and workers.415 In our view, the Supreme
Court will eventually recognize the need to establish judicial review standards
for the arbitration of individual employment rights in the same way it fashioned a
federal common law for enforcing collective bargaining agreements in the
Trilogy.
3. Our database also provides some information about the speed and
efficiency of this dispute resolution process. While some cases fit the prototype
of a short, inexpensive and therefore accessible process, 416 others functioned
worse than court adjudications. 417 It appears that when employment arbitrations
fail to deliver on their reputed advantages over civil trials, courts invest less faith
in this ADR process. More searching review of the arbitration award is likely to
follow in these situations.
under § 10(a) of the FAA, the court cited Areca, Inc. v. Oppenheimer & Co., Inc., 960 F.
Supp. 52, 54-55 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), a dispute between investors and a brokerage firm);
Chisolm v. Kidder, Peabody Asset Mgmt., 966 F. Supp. 218, 222 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) affd,
164 F.3d 617 (2d Cir. 1998) (in applying the FAA, the court cited Carte Blanche (Sing.) v.
Carte Blanche (Int'l), 888 F.2d 260,264-65 (2d Cir. 1989), a dispute between a credit card
services franchisee and franchisor).
415 See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574,578-79
(1960), where the Court saw a fundamental contrast between labor and commercial
arbitration:
Since arbitration of labor disputes has quite different functions from arbitration under
an ordinary commercial agreement, the hostility evinced by courts toward arbitration of
commercial agreements has no place here. For arbitration of labor disputes under
collective bargaining agreements is part and parcel of the collective bargaining process
itself.
The collective bargaining agreement states the rights and duties of the
parties.... [i]t is more than a contract; it is a generalized code to govern a myriad of
cases which the draftsmen cannot wholly anticipate.... It calls into being a new
common law-the common law of a particular industry or of a particular plant."
Id.
4 16 Ahing v. Lehman Bros., No. 94 Civ. 9027, 2000 WL 460443 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 20,
2000).
417 Mayes v. Lanier Worldwide, Inc., 115 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 1337 (M.D. Ala.
2000) (nine hearing days); LaPrade, 94 F. Supp. 2d at 7 (seventy-four hearing dates and
conferences from 1993-1999); Sobol, 49 F. Supp. 2d at 213 (sixty-two hearing days from
1994-1998); Chisolm v. Kidder, PeabodyAsset Mgmt., 966 F. Supp. at 220-21 (forty-three
hearing days from 1992-1996).
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4. We have too little data to conclude that there are regional differences in
confirmation rates for individual employment awards. Nevertheless, our results
imply that courts in the First and Second Circuits are poised to play a leading
role in developing a federal common law for these awards.4 18 We base this
prediction on the fact that more precedents are now in place in these circuits to
enable future courts to vacate awards. Here, we also note that courts in these
circuits have been among early courts in the nation to adopt more expansive
theories of employer liability in discrimination cases.4 19 We hypothesize a
positive correlation between a circuit's adoption of more expansive theories of
employer liability, and its tendency to vacate awards that result from employer
designed and imposed dispute resolution systems that a judge believes is
unfair.42
0
418 We base this preliminary conclusion on Finding I. See supra Section IV.
419 For example, the First Circuit Court of Appeals, in the still controversial area of
whether a court should consider sexual harassment in a Title VII lawsuit from a woman's
perspective, endorsed this view in 1988. See Lipsett v. Univ. of P.R., 864 F.2d 881, 898
(1 st Cir. 1988) ("Unless the fact finder keeps both the man's and the woman's perspective
in mind, 'defendants as well as the courts [will be] permitted to sustain ingrained notions of
reasonable behavior fashioned by the offenders . . . ."'). Although the Second Circuit
subscribes to the widely accepted legal principle that harassment must be sufficiently severe
or pervasive to alterthe conditions in order to support a hostile-work environment claim, it
took a liberal view of this matter as early as 1989. See Carrero v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth.,
890 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1989):
A female employee need not subject herself to an extended period of demeaning and
degrading provocation before being entitled to seek the remedies provided under Title
VII. It is not how long the sexual innuendoes, slurs, verbal assaults, or obnoxious
course of conduct lasts. The offensiveness of the individual actions complained of is
also a factor to be considered in determining whether such actions are pervasive.
Id. at 578.
420 To be clear, we underscore our sense that this hypothesis needs empirical testing
before any firm conclusions can be reached. Moreover, we note that is quite possible that a
circuit that exhibits a tendency to vacate an unusuallyhigh percentage of pro-union awards
maybehave differently where individual employment claims are asserted. In this regard, we
call attention to a pertinent Fourth Circuit decision which is seemingly uncharacteristic of
this conservative court. See Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999).
There the court refused to enforce a Gilmer-type employment arbitration agreement because
the arbitration system imposed on the complainant by Hooters was "egregiously unfair."Id.
at 938. The court reasoned,
We hold that the promulgation of so many biased rules especially the scheme whereby
one party to the proceeding so controls the arbitral panel-breaches the contract entered
into by the parties.... By creating a sham system unworthy even of the name of
arbitration, Hooters completely failed in performing its contractual duty.
Id. at 940.
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C. Conclusions and Predictions
We conclude by taking a long term view of the relationship between federal
courts and workplace disputes. Our research shows that private justice resides in
the shadow of public courts, for the judiciary displays considerable-but
definitely not unlimited-deference to the decisions of private arbitrators. In the
unionized sector our research strongly suggests that the existing judicial review
equilibrium-only a tiny slice of awards are appealed, and the courts vacate less
than a third of these challenged awards-will continue. Our research provides
almost no support for claims that the federal courts are increasingly undermining
the finality of the labor arbitration process.
Individual employment arbitration also operates in substantial autonomy.
This is evident in the current move by many nonunion employers to embrace
employment arbitration as a means to avoid litigation over workplace disputes.
The Supreme Court legitimated this trend in Gilmer and again in Circuit City. As
a consequence, employers can be reasonably confident that courts will enforce
the awards produced via their arbitration agreements.42' At the same time, our
research shows that federal judges will vacate those awards they believe to be the
product of unfair arbitration procedures or seriously improper arbitrator decision
making. These vacatur decisions are one of the factors encouraging employers to
improve the fairness of their compulsory arbitration systems.422 These decisions
may also embolden individual complainants who lose their arbitration claims to
scrutinize arbitrators more closely.423 In sum, just as the shadow of judicial
oversight has fostered a healthy mix of autonomy and public accountability for
421 But see id.
422 See Order Granting Approval to Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Arbitration
of Employment Discrimination Claims, 63 Fed. Reg. 35299 (June 29, 1998) (as of January
1, 1999, NASD member employers are no longer required to impose pre-dispute arbitration
agreements on associated securities dealers); Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Changes by
New York Stock Exchange, Inc. Relating to Arbitration Rules, 63 Fed. Reg. 52782 (Oct. 1,
1998) (N.Y.S.E. has proposed that it would no longer make its arbitration system available
to hear employment discrimination cases, unless the parties agree to arbitration after the
dispute has arisen).
423 See Sobol v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 49 F. Supp. 2d 208, 223 n.20 (1999) (in
alleging bias, plaintiff cited the arbitrators' track record of awarding low damages, as well
as criticism of the NASD for its partiality in selecting arbitrators); see also Rosenberg v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 995 F. Supp. 190, 206-12 (D. Mass. 1998)
(mem.), aff'd on other grounds, 170 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1999) (refusing to compel arbitration
of Title VII sex discrimination claim due to institutional bias); cf York Research Corp. v.
Landgarten, 927 F.2d 119, 122 (2d Cir.1991) (rejecting charge of arbitral bias that was
raised after the rendering of an unfavorable award).
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labor arbitration, judicial review of individual employment arbitration awards is
slowly but surely moving this newer dispute resolution system in the same
direction.
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